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Chapter 1
I develop a theoretical model for investigating the cost of failure to commit in
the provision of bailouts to financial institutions. When a financial institution
fails, the fiscal authority often deviates from its ex-ante no-bailout commitment:
the ex-post best response is to bailout. The fiscal authority’s time inconsistency
creates moral hazard. I calculate the welfare loss from the failure to commit. In
the model, as long as the fiscal authority is able to commit to a pre-determined
bailout policy, the outcome is typically constrained efficient. Furthermore, a
higher probability of bank run is not always welfare reducing. Increased run
probability can be beneficial by making financial institutions more cautious,
thus decreasing the moral hazard loss. Regulations on short-term interest rates
offered by financial institutions can deter moral hazard, particularly when the
run probability is small.
Chapter 2
This chapter analyzes the optimal bailout policy in an interconnected banking
system. Banks are allowed to deposit in each other to hedge against idiosyn-
cratic liquidity shocks. When a fraction of banks in the economy are hit by a
liquidity shock and become insolvent, there are potential spillovers to solvent
banks. In this case, the optimal bailout policy is not always either a full bailout
or zero bailout. It is sometimes optimal for the fiscal authority to provide partial
bailouts that are just sufficient to prevent spillovers. The decision of the fiscal
authority depends on how much pressure from taxpayers and banks. If the ur-
gency to save the banking sector outweighs the utility from public goods, a full
bailout is optimal, and vice versa. When the two effects are comparable, the
optimal decision of the fiscal authority is partial bailout.
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CHAPTER 1
BANK BAILOUTS: THE COST OF INABILITY TO COMMIT
1.1 Introduction
There is an important debate on whether the fiscal authority should bail out
insolvent financial institutions. On one hand, bailouts create moral hazard be-
cause they incentivizes financial institutions to hold riskier portfolios or to offer
higher short-term payoffs to investors. On the other hand, bailouts could po-
tentially save financial institutions from a crisis caused by forces outside the
banking sector.
Over the past decades, various regulations have been employed with the
intention of reducing moral hazard and failures of financial institutions. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Glass-Steagall Act, and Reg-
ulation Q were created in accordance with the 1933 Banking Act to battle bank
failures. The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was
signed into the U.S. federal law in 2010, which introduced extensive oversight
on financial institutions.
Recent bank failures, however, have shown that financial institutions are
fragile despite substantial efforts and regulations by policymakers. In partic-
ular, the S&L crisis of the 1980s and the failure of Washington Mutual in 2008
proved that depository institutions are vulnerable to runs even with deposit
insurance protection from the FDIC.
Even when restricting bailouts is optimal, it is often difficult for the fiscal
authority to commit to such policy. The bailout episode during the financial
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crisis of 2008, in which the U.S. Treasury allocated over $700 billion to purchase
distressed assets from banks, is a leading example of the commitment failure by
the fiscal authority. To restore the confidence in the credit market, the bailout
package was approved over substantial opposition. Financial institutions are
aware of the commitment issue and often exploit it for their own benefits.
Since financial institutions are susceptible to failures, and bailouts are in-
evitable, it remains crucial to understand the extent of moral hazard in financial
institutions arising from bailouts. Existing literature has focused heavily on the
comparison between the flexible bailout regime and the zero-bailout regime.1
Even when bailouts create moral hazard, the zero-bailout policy is not always
superior (Keister (2016)). The flexible bailout regime is preferred when effective
financial regulatory tools are available (Keister and Narasiman (2016)).
This paper takes a different direction and focuses on the isolation of the so-
cial cost of bailouts that arises solely from the commitment failure of the fiscal
authority. It differs from the existing literature in that the comparison is made
between the flexible bailout regime and the pre-committed bailout regime.2 The
main result of this paper is that moral hazard arises predominantly from the
failure of the fiscal authority to commit to a pre-determined bailout policy.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) introduced an environment that allows for
panic-based runs on a bank. A panic-based run is generated solely by the belief
of the depositors that all the other depositors are running, which is unrelated
to the fundamentals of the economy. However, as long as the depositors be-
lieve that all the other depositors are not running, the panic-based run will be
1The flexible bailout regime is when the fiscal authority decides on the bailout policy after
financial institutions have failed.
2The pre-committed bailout regime is when the fiscal authority commits to the ex-ante opti-
mal bailout policy before financial institutions fail.
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avoided. By merely changing the belief of the depositors, a catastrophic equi-
librium outcome can be averted.
Peck and Shell (2003) refined the equilibria in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
by introducing the pre-deposit game. Peck and Shell (2003) runs are panic-
based, driven by sunspots. See also Shell and Zhang (2017).3 Additionally, by
having a finite number of depositors, there is aggregate uncertainty on the de-
mand for liquidity in the economy.4 This allows for a clear distinction in the
causes of a bank run. A fundamental-driven run is caused by a high demand
for liquidity; a panic-based run is caused by the belief of the depositors that the
other depositors are running the bank. In my terminology in this paper (follow-
ing Keister), a run can be either panic-based or fundamental-driven.
Keister (2016) introduced the fiscal authority into the Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) framework. The fiscal authority collects taxes to fund the public good and
bailouts. When there is a bank run, the fiscal authority is able to bail out banks
but doing so is costly to the public as bailouts reduce the resources available for
public good provision.
In this paper, I adapt the environment of Shell and Zhang (2017) with the
fiscal authority from Keister (2016). By having a finite number of deposi-
tors in each bank, the magnitude of the demand for liquidity is stochastic,
adding an additional layer of uncertainty for the fiscal authority when provid-
ing bailouts; the fiscal authority does not have the information on whether a run
is fundamental-driven or panic-based.
3The sunspot equilibrium concept was introduced by Shell (1977). See also Cass and Shell
(1983).
4There is no aggregate uncertainty in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Keister (2016) because
there is a measure of depositors.
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The source of a bank run is crucial. A high demand for liquidity corresponds
to urgency in consumptions. This could due to an emergency or a strong desire
for immediate consumption, and is referred to as the “impulse demand” in Shell
and Zhang (2017). Therefore, the fiscal authority should respond with a higher
level of bailout if the bank run is fundamental-driven. On the other hand, if the
bank run is panic-based, the fiscal authority should hold back and cut down on
bailouts since the urgency of the early withdrawals is lower.
Two economies are analyzed in this paper: (1) the economy under the fis-
cal authority with commitment (the pre-committed bailout regime) and (2) the
economy under the fiscal authority without commitment (the flexible bailout
regime). The fiscal authority with commitment is assumed to have the ability to
pre-commit to a bailout policy prior to the occurence of a bank run. The fiscal
authority without commitment decides on the bailout policy after a bank run is
observed. The difference in the welfares achieved in the two economies is the
welfare loss from the inability of the fiscal authority to commit. The amount of
endowment required to compensate the depositors in each of the two economies
to bring them to the constrained efficient welfare level is also computed. This
amount (in units of endowment) indicates the “real” loss from moral hazard.
The main result of this paper is that when the fiscal authority is able to com-
mit to a bailout policy, the economy is typically constrained efficient. However,
if the fiscal authority is unable to commit, the economy is never constrained
efficient. The second result is that a higher probability of bank run does not al-
ways hurt welfare. It can strategically induce banks to be more conservative and
hence, reduce moral hazard and increase welfare. The third result is that allow-
ing the fiscal authority to regulate short-term interest rates offered by banks can
4
increase the efficiency of the economy.5 When the probability of a bank run is
low, the ability of the fiscal authority to regulate short-term interest rates makes
the economy constrained efficient even when the fiscal authority is unable to
commit.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 introduces the frame-
work. Section 3 analyzes the constrained efficient allocation. Section 4 analyzes
the economy under the fiscal authority with commitment. Section 5 analyzes
the economy under the fiscal authority without commitment. Section 6 inves-
tigates a potential policy tool to reduce the welfare loss from the inability of
the fiscal authority to commit. Section 7 concludes the paper. The proofs of all
Lemmas and Propositions are in the Appendix.
1.2 The Banking Environment
There is a fiscal authority, a measure of banks, and two groups of depositors,
DA and DB. Each bank serves exactly two depositors, one from each group.
There are three periods t = 0, 1, 2. In period 0, each depositor is endowed with
y units of consumption good that is subject to a fractional tax τ . There is an in-
finitely divisible, constant returns to scale technology that returns either 1 unit
of consumption good in period 1 or R > 1 units in period 2 for each unit of
consumption good invested in period 0. There is also a costless storage tech-
nology between periods. Both the banks and the depositors have access to both
technologies.
The depositors are identical in period 0. In period 1, each group of depositors
5Regulation Q is an example of regulations on short-term interest rates.
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turns impatient with probability p and patient with probability 1 − p indepen-
dently.6 The sunspot states α and β are realized in period 1 with probabilities
1− s and s respectively.7
The depositors observe their own types (patient or impatient) and the
sunspot state. Types are private information. Each depositor maximizes her
own utility by choosing to withdraw in period 1 (early) or period 2 (late) con-
tingent on her type and sunspots. The early withdrawals are bounded by the
sequential service constraint. If both depositors in a bank decide to withdraw
in early, each depositor has 1/2 probability to be the first in the line. The depos-
itors make their withdrawal decisions before they observe their positions in the
line.
Define c1 and c2 as the withdrawals in period 1 and 2 respectively and x as
the private consumption of a depositor. Let u(x) be the utility for an impatient
depositor and v(x) be the utility for a patient depositor where
u(x) = A
x1−γ
1− γ ,
v(x) =
x1−γ
1− γ ,
γ > 1 is the measure of relative risk aversion and A ≥ 1 is the impulse de-
mand of the impatient depositors.8 An impatient depositor only derives utility
from period-1 consumption (x = c1). A patient depositor only derives utility
from period-2 consumption but can costlessly store period-1 withdrawal c1 for
period-2 consumption (x = c1 + c2).
6This implies that liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated among the banks. This deters the
banks from pooling their resources to hedge against the shocks.
7Sunspots are used for equilibrium coordination, which will be discussed in later sections.
8It is natural to assume that A ≥ 1 since an impatient depositor typically has a more urgent
need for consumption compared to a patient depositor.
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Each bank writes a deposit contract that maximizes the ex-ante expected
utilities of its own depositors from private consumptions (withdrawals). Since
there are only two depositors in each bank and the early withdrawals are
bounded by the sequential service constraint,9 the deposit contract can be sum-
marized as a scalar c ∈ [0, 2(1 − τ)y), where c is the payment to the first in line
in period 1. If both depositors withdraw in period 1, the first in line receives
c and the second in line receives the leftover consumption good in the bank
(2(1 − τ)y − c). If only one depositor decides to withdraw in period 1, she re-
ceives c. The leftover consumption good remains in the technology so the other
depositor receives (2(1 − τ)y − c)R in period 2. If both depositors withdraw in
period 2, they split the resources in the bank evenly. Each depositor receives
(1− τ)yR.
The fiscal authority chooses the bailout policy that maximizes welfare, which
is the sum of the expected utilities of all the depositors from both private con-
sumption and public good consumption.10 The utility of each depositor from
public good provision is given by
Γ(g) = G
g1−γ
1− γ ,
where g is the level of public good funded by the fiscal authority, γ is the mea-
sure of relative risk aversion and G > 0 is the measure of the relative value of
public good.11
The bailout policy chosen by the fiscal authority is the scalar B ∈ [0, 2τy),
where B is the amount of bailout paid to each bank that experiences a bank
run (both depositors withdrawing early). A bank run is fundamental-driven
9See Wallace (1988)
10The inclusion of the fiscal authority in the bank run model was first done by Keister (2016).
11Larger G implies a higher cost of bailouts.
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if all the depositors who withdraw early are impatient. A bank run is panic-
based if at least one of the depositors who withdraw early is patient.12 The
bailout payments are used by the banks to fund their second-in-line depositors’
withdrawals.13
If one or no depositor withdraws early, all tax revenue goes to public good
provision, g = 2τy. If there is a bank run, bailout payments are funded from tax
revenues. In general, the level of the public good provision is g = 2τy − B.14
The reduction of public good provision is the cost of bailouts in this model.
1.2.1 Timeline
From Peck and Shell (2003), events taking place in period 0 are referred to as
the pre-deposit game. Events that take place in periods 1 and 2 are referred to
as the post-deposit game. In the pre-deposit game, each depositor receives an
endowment of y units of consumption good and pays a tax τy to the fiscal au-
thority. Then, each bank writes a deposit contract c. Each depositor observes the
deposit contract and decides whether to deposit her disposable income (1− τ)y
into the bank. This marks the end of the pre-deposit game. In the post-deposit
game, each depositor observes her own type and sunspots before deciding to
withdraw early or late.
If the fiscal authority is able to commit, it chooses a bailout policy B right
12The theoretical distinction between panic-based and fundamental-driven runs was intro-
duced by Keister and Narasiman (2016).
13By the time the fiscal authority realizes that there is a bank run, the first-in-line depositor
has already left the bank. Therefore, the bailout payment made to a bank can only be added to
the withdrawal of the second-in-line depositor.
14Since the types within each group of depositors are perfectly correlated, the ex-post outcome
in all the banks are identical. This is a slight abuse of notation but eventually either all banks
receive a bailout B, and g = 2τy −B, or all banks receive no bailout, and g = 2τy.
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Pre-deposit
game
Endowments received
and taxes paid
t = 0
Fiscal authority with
commitment chooses B
Banks choose c
Depositors make
deposit decision
Post-deposit
game
t = 1
Depositors observe
type and sunspot
Depositors make
withdrawal decision
Fiscal authority without
commitment chooses B
t = 2
Public good
provided
Figure 1.1: Timeline
after taxes are collected and before the banks write a deposit contract. Since
the banks are identical ex-ante, the same bailout policy applies to every bank in
the economy. The bailout policy is observed immediately by the banks and the
depositors.
If the fiscal authority is unable to commit, it chooses a bailout policy B only
when after it observes that both depositors in a bank withdraw early. Since
banks are also identical ex-post (due to perfectly correlated types within the
groups of depositors DA and DB), the optimal bailout responses of the fiscal
authority for all the banks in the economy are identical.
Figure 1.1 summarizes the series of events in the pre-deposit game and the
post-deposit game under the fiscal authority with commitment and the fiscal
authority without commitment.
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1.3 The Constrained Efficient Allocation
This section solves for the constrained efficient allocation that is used as a bench-
mark for later comparisons. I suppose that there is a welfare maximizing plan-
ner that makes decisions for both the fiscal authority and the banks. The plan-
ner, however, is unable to observe the types or dictate the decisions of the de-
positors.15 The deposit contract c and the bailout policyB chosen by the planner
determines the constrained efficient allocation. The welfare achieved by the con-
strained efficient allocation gives a good benchmark for identifying the degree
of welfare loss the economy incurs by moving from a centralized institutional
setting to a decentralized one.
1.3.1 The Post-deposit Game
Taking the deposit contract c and the bailout policyB from the pre-deposit game
as given, the depositors have to simultaneously decide when to withdraw after
observing their own types and sunspots. This is a two-player static game with
incomplete information. The expected utility of a depositor from withdrawing
early or late depends on the decision and the type of the other depositor. A
depositor always withdraws early if she is impatient, so the analysis focuses on
the patient depositors.
Definition 1. The panic equilibrium in the post-deposit game is an equilibrium in
which both depositors withdraw early regardless of their types.
15The unconstrained first-best, which will be introduced later, is when the planner can ob-
serve the types of the depositors and dictate their decisions. This important distinction was
introduced by Ennis and Keister (2016).
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Definition 2. The non-panic equilibrium in the post-deposit game is an equilibrium in
which both depositors withdraw early (late) if and only if they are impatient (patient).
Since c is the amount promised to the first early withdrawal, a higher c in-
creases the expected utility of a patient depositor from withdrawing early. A
higher c also decreases the expected amount of resources available at period 2
and thus lowers the expected utility of a patient depositor from withdrawing
late.
Lemma 1. If γ < 1 + ln 2/ lnR, there exists a threshold c¯early(B) such that a panic
equilibrium in the post-deposit game exists if and only if c > c¯early(B).
Lemma 1 is an extension of Shell and Zhang (2018). It shows that for any
given B, if c is sufficiently small (i.e. c ≤ c¯early(B)), then a patient depositor
withdraws late regardless of her belief about the action of the other depositor.
Then, there is no panic equilibrium.
Lemma 2. If γ < 1+ln 2/ lnR, there exists a threshold c¯wait(B) such that a non-panic
equilibrium in the post-deposit game exists if and only if c ≤ c¯wait(B).
Lemma 2 implies that for any given B, if c is sufficiently high (i.e. c >
c¯wait(B)) a patient depositor withdraws early regardless of her belief about the
action of the other depositor. Therefore, there is no non-panic equilibrium.
Lemma 3. c¯early(B) < c¯wait(B) for B ∈ [0, 2τy] if
γ < min{2, 1 + ln 2/ lnR}. (1.1)
If c¯early(B) < c ≤ c¯wait(B), both the panic and non-panic equilibria exist in
the post-deposit game. The deposit contract c is large enough so that a patient
11
0 cearly(B)
Only the non-panic
equilibrium exists
cwait(B)
Both the panic and non-panic
equilibria exist
Only the panic
equilibrium exists
2(1− τ)y
c
Figure 1.2: Equilibria of the Post-deposit Game
depositor withdraws early if she believes that the other depositor – if patient
– also withdraws early. However, c is low enough such that a patient depos-
itor withdraws late if she believes that the other depositor - if patient - also
withdraws late. In this case, the actions of the depositors exhibit strategic com-
plementarity. The depositors coordinate on the equilibria via sunspots. Without
loss of generality, the depositors play the non-panic (panic) equilibrium in state
α (β),
For the remainder of the paper, the analyses only focus on the range of γ
that satisfies 1.1. This excludes the possibility of strategic substitutability in the
actions of the two depositors.16 Figure 1.2 summarizes the equilibria of the post-
deposit game for c ∈ [0, 2(1− τ)y], given B.17
The thresholds cearly(B) and cwait(B) are strictly decreasing functions of B.
Higher B increases the expected utility of withdrawing early since bailout is
added to the second early withdrawal. Therefore, higher B has to be compen-
sated with a lower c in order to keep the propensity to run and the actions of
16Strategic substitutability is when a patient depositor withdraws early (late) if she believes
that the other depositor - if patient - withdraws late (early). See Shell and Zhang (2018)
17The detailed derivations of the post-deposit game can be found in Section A.1 of the Ap-
pendix. Figure 1.2 is adapted from Shell and Zhang (2018).
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the patient depositors the same.
The constraint c ≤ c¯wait(B) is the Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC).
It has to be satisfied in order for the depositors to be willing to deposit dur-
ing the pre-deposit game. If the ICC is violated, the ex-ante expected utility
of a depositor from depositing is lower than autarky. The depositors would
not have deposited their endowments into the banks and there would not be a
post-deposit game.
Define the following sets:
Searly = {(c, B) ∈ R2+|c ≤ c¯early(B), B ≤ 2τy}
Swait = {(c, B) ∈ R2+|c ≤ c¯wait(B), B ≤ 2τy}.
According to Lemma 3, Searly is a strict subset of Swait as long as (1.1) holds.
Definition 3. An allocation (c, B) is Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC)
if and only if (c, B) ∈ Searly.
The term “dominant strategy” comes from the fact that withdrawing late is the
dominant strategy for patient depositors when (c, B) ∈ Searly. The expected
utility from depositing is higher than autarky regardless of sunspots.
Definition 4. An allocation (c, B) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if and only
if (c, B) ∈ Swait.
If an allocation (c, B) is BIC, the ex-post expected utility from depositing
might be higher or lower than autarky, depending on sunspots. However, de-
positors are still better off depositing ex-ante. Notice that DSIC is a strictly
stronger condition than BIC as long as (1.1) holds.18
18The terms DSIC and BIC were introduced into the bank run literature by Shell and Zhang
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1.3.2 The Pre-deposit Game
In the pre-deposit game, the planner decides (c, B) that maximizes the welfare
of the economy. The welfare functions are different in the non-panic equilibrium
and the panic equilibrium. Let Ŵ (c, B) be the ex-ante expected welfare in the
non-panic equilibrium, and is given by
Ŵ (c, B) = p2
[
u(c) + u(2(1− τ)y − c+B) + 2Γ(2τy −B)]
+ 2p(1− p)[u(c) + v((2(1− τ)y − c)R) + 2Γ(2τy)]
+ (1− p)2[2v((1− τ)yR) + 2Γ(2τy)]. (1.2)
In the non-panic equilibrium, only impatient depositors withdraw early.
With probability p2, both depositors are impatient and withdraw early in ev-
ery bank. Their utilities are given by u. The first depositor receives c and the
second receives the leftover resources plus the bailout (2(1 − τ)y − c + B). The
utility of each depositor from public good provision is given by Γ. Since every
bank receives the same bailout B, the aggregate bailout in the economy is B.
The level of the public good provision is g = 2τy −B.
With probability 2p(1−p), exactly one depositor is impatient and withdraws
early (in each bank). The impatient depositor with utility function u receives c
in period 1 and the patient depositor with utility function v receives the returns
from the leftover consumption good that remains in the technology (2(1− τ)y−
c)R in period 2. Since there is exactly one withdrawal in period 1 in every bank,
there is no bailout. All tax revenue goes towards the public good provision,
g = 2τy.
With probability (1 − p)2, both depositors are patient and withdraw late in
(2018).
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every bank. The two depositors split the returns from the investment in period
2. Each depositor receives (1−τ)yR. Let W run(c, B) be ex-ante expected welfare
in the panic equilibrium, and is given by
W run(c, B) = p2
[
u(c) + u(2(1− τ)y − c+B)]
+ p(1− p)[u(c) + v(2(1− τ)y − c+B) + v(c)
+ u(2(1− τ)y − c+B)]
+ (1− p)2[v(c) + v(2(1− τ)y − c+B)]+ 2Γ(2τy −B).
In the panic equilibrium, all depositors withdraw early regardless of their
types. The first depositor receives c and the second depositor 2(1− τ)y − c+B.
With probability p2, both depositors are impatient and their utilities are given
by u.
With probability 2p(1 − p), exactly one depositor is impatient in each bank.
If the impatient depositor withdraws first, the sum of the utilities of the two
depositors is u(c) + v(2(1 − τ)y − c + B). If the impatient depositor withdraws
second, the sum is v(c)+u(2(1−τ)y−c+B). Each of these events happens with
probability 1/2.
With probability (1 − p)2, both depositors are patient and their utilities are
given by v. Since there are always two withdrawals in period 1, bailout payment
B is made to all banks with certainty. The level of public good provision is
always 2τy −B in the panic equilibrium.
If the planner chooses a DSIC allocation such that (c, B) ∈ Searly, the ex-ante
expected welfare is Ŵ (c, B) since only the non-panic equilibrium exists in the
post-deposit game. If the allocation is not BIC such that (c, B) /∈ Swait, the ex-
ante expected welfare is W run(c, B) since only the panic equilibrium exists in
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the post-deposit game. If the allocation is BIC but not DSIC such that (c, B) ∈
Swait\Searly, sunspots matter. With probability 1 − s (s), the sunspot state α (β)
realizes and the depositors play the non-panic (panic) equilibrium in the post-
deposit game, which gives expected welfare Ŵ (c, B) (W run(c, B)). Let W˜ (c, B; s)
be the ex-ante expected welfare when (c, B) ∈ Swait\Searly. Then, we have
W˜ (c, B; s) = (1− s)Ŵ (c, B) + sW run(c, B). (1.3)
The planner’s problem is
max
(c,B)∈Swait
W (c, B; s) =

Ŵ (c, B) if (c, B) ∈ Searly
W˜ (c, B; s) if (c, B) /∈ Searly
. (1.4)
The planner’s choices are constrained by (c, B) ∈ Swait to ensure that the ICC
is satisfied so that the depositors accept the deposit contract. Let (c∗, B∗) be the
solution to (1.4). By definition, (c∗, B∗) is the constrained efficient allocation.
1.3.3 Characterization of the Constrained Efficient Allocation
This section provides a full characterization of the constrained efficient alloca-
tion. Let (ĉ, B̂) be the unconstrained efficient allocation, where
(ĉ, B̂) ≡ arg max
(c,B)∈R2+
Ŵ (c, B).
The welfare that the unconstrained efficient allocation maximizes is exactly
the welfare of the non-panic equilibrium Ŵ (c, B). The unconstrained efficient
allocation is assumed to be chosen by an unconstrained planner with the abil-
ity to observe the types of the depositors and dictate their actions. Thus, the
unconstrained efficient economy is equivalent to the constrained efficient econ-
omy with truth-telling depositors such that the panic equilibrium never occurs.
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Therefore, the unconstrained planner maximizes the welfare in the non-panic
equilibrium and is not subject to the ICC constraint or the DSIC constraint.
The unconstained efficient allocation (ĉ, B̂) is implementable in the con-
strained efficient economy if and only if it is DSIC.19 When the unconstrained
efficient allocation is not implementable, further analyses are required to solve
for the constrained efficient allocation. The constrained efficient allocation can
be characterized into the following 3 cases based on the implementability of the
unconstrained efficient allocation (ĉ, B̂):
1) (ĉ, B̂) is DSIC,
2) (ĉ, B̂) is BIC but not DSIC, or
3) (ĉ, B̂) is neither BIC nor DSIC.
Lemma 4. There exist Aearly, Await ∈ R, where Await > Aearly, such that the uncon-
strained efficient allocation is DSIC whenA ≤ Aearly (Case 1), BIC but not DSIC when
Aearly < A ≤ Await (Case 2) and neither BIC nor DSIC when A > Await (Case 3) .
Lemma 4 suggests that the value of the impulse demand parameter A dic-
tates which of the three cases the unconstrained efficient allocation falls in. The
deposit contract c and bailout policy B set by the planner are positively cor-
related with the intensity of the impulse demand of the impatient depositors.
Holding everything else equal, higher impulse demand incentivizes the planner
to divert resources from late withdrawals to early withdrawals, hence higher c.
In addition, it also incentivizes the planner to redistribute resources from public
consumption to private consumption, hence higher B.
19The parameter values are restricted such that the unconstrained efficient allocation always
dominates any implementable panic-based run permitting allocations. The detail of the param-
eter restrictions can be found in Section A.2 of the Appendix.
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Higher c and B increase the propensity of the patient depositors to run since
more resources are diverted towards the early withdrawals. When the impulse
demand is sufficiently low (A ≤ Aearly), the propensity to run is sufficiently low
such that the unconstrained efficient allocation (ĉ, B̂) is DSIC. As the impulse
demand gets higher into the mid-range (Aearly < A ≤ Await), the propensity
to run is high enough that the (ĉ, B̂) is no longer DSIC but still low enough
such that (ĉ, B̂) is still BIC. When the impulse demand gets sufficiently high
(A > Await), the propensity to run is so high that (ĉ, B̂) is neither DSIC nor BIC.
Case 1: The Unconstrained Efficient Allocation is DSIC
If (ĉ, B̂) is DSIC, then (ĉ, B̂) ∈ Searly is implementable in the constrained efficient
economy. The unconstrained efficient allocation is also the solution to (1.4), and
is given by
(c∗, B∗) = (ĉ, B̂).
The constrained efficient allocation is panic-based run-proof for s ∈ [0, 1] and
independent of s.
Case 2: The Unconstrained Efficient Allocation is BIC but not DSIC
Since (ĉ, B̂) /∈ Searly, the unconstrained efficient allocation is not implementable
in the constrained efficient economy except for the special case of s = 0.20 The
extent of the deviation of the constrained efficient allocation (c∗, B∗) from the
unconstrained efficient allocation (ĉ, B̂) depends on the panic-based run proba-
bility s.
20The unconstrained and constrained efficient economies are identical when s = 0 because
Ŵ (c,B) = W˜ (c,B; 0)
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Define (c˜, B˜) as the best panic-based run-permitting allocation and
(cearly, Bearly) as the best panic-based run-proof allocation when (ĉ, B̂) is non-
implementable. They are given by
(c˜, B˜) := arg max
(c,B)∈R2+
W˜ (c, B; s)
Bearly := arg max
B∈[0,2τy]
Ŵ (c¯early(B), B) (1.5)
cearly := c¯early(Bearly).
The constrained efficient allocation is either the best panic-based run-permitting
allocation (c˜, B˜) or the best panic-based run-proof allocation (cearly, Bearly),
whichever gives the higher welfare.
Proposition 5. In Case 2, there exists s0 ∈ (0, 1] such that for any s ≥ s0, the con-
strained efficient allocation is panic-based run-proof, and for s < s0, the constrained
efficient allocation panic-based run-permitting.
(c∗, B∗) =

(c˜, B˜) if s < s0
(cearly, Bearly) if s ≥ s0
The benefit of tolerating panic-based runs is that the planner can offer larger
deposit contracts c and larger bailout policies B to efficiently reallocate re-
sources from the withdrawals of patient depositors and the public good provi-
sion to the withdrawals of impatient depositors. On the other hand, tolerating
panic-based runs increases the expected amount of investment liquidated early
and allows for the possibility of the patient depositors consuming the resources
allocated for the impatient depositors.
It can be seen from (1.5) that the best panic-based run-proof allocation
(cearly, Bearly) and the corresponding welfare Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) are independent of
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s. On the other hand, the best panic-based run-permitting welfare W˜ (c˜, B˜; s) is
decreasing in s. Higher s exacerbates the inefficiency that arises from tolerating
panic-based runs. Proposition 5 suggests that the best panic-based run-proof
welfare is higher when s ≥ s0, while the panic-based run-permitting welfare is
higher otherwise.
When the panic-based run probability is sufficiently small (s < s0), the ben-
efits of tolerating runs outweigh the inefficiencies that arise from it. The con-
strained efficient allocation is panic-based run-permitting and dependent on
s. As s gets large (s ≥ s0), the inefficiencies arising from tolerating panic-
based runs overshadow the benefits. The constrained efficient allocation jumps
from panic-based run-permitting to panic-based run-proof. The constrained
efficient allocation (c∗, B∗) is discontinuous at s0 but the corresponding wel-
fare Ŵ (c∗, B∗) is continuous as it is comprised of the envelope of two welfare
functions: the best panic-based run-proof welfare Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) and the best
panic-based run-permitting welfare W˜ (c˜, B˜; s).
Case 3: The Unconstrained Efficient Allocation is neither BIC nor DSIC
Similar to Case 2, the unconstrained efficient allocation is not implementable in
the constrained efficient economy. Moreover, the unconstrained efficient allo-
cation is not BIC. When s is sufficiently close to 0, (c˜, B˜) is also not BIC. That
makes (c˜, B˜) non-implementable in the constrained efficient economy since the
ICC is violated.
Let (cwait, Bwait) be the best run-permitting allocation when (c˜, B˜) is non-
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implementable, where
Bwait := max
B∈[0,2τy]
W˜ (c¯wait(B), B; s)
cwait := c¯wait(Bwait).
Proposition 6. In Case 3, there exist s1 ∈ (0, 1] and s2 ∈ (0, s1] such that for s ≥
s1, the constrained efficient allocation is panic-based run-proof; for s2 ≤ s < s1, the
constrained efficient allocation tolerates panic-based runs and the ICC is non-binding;
and for s < s2, the constrained efficient allocation still tolerates panic-based runs but
the ICC is binding.
(c∗, B∗) =

(cwait, Bwait) if s < s2
(c˜, B˜) if s2 ≤ s < s1
(cearly, Bearly) if s ≥ s1
The equilibrium characterization in Case 3 suggested by Proposition 6 is sim-
ilar to the equilibrium characterization in Case 2 suggested by Proposition 5
except that the ICC is binding for a positive measure of the panic-based run
probability, s ∈ [0, s2). The intuition behind the jump of the constrained effi-
cient allocation from panic-based run-permitting to panic-based run-proof at s1
is similar to Case 2.
In Case 3, the high impulse demand (A > Await) incentivizes the plan-
ner to direct more resources toward the impatient depositors by choosing a
higher deposit contract and a more generous bailout policy. This also makes
early withdrawals more attractive for the patient depositors. For a sufficiently
small panic-based run probability (s < s2), the allocation chosen by the plan-
ner makes early withdrawals so attractive that the patient depositors choose
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to withdraw early regardless of their beliefs about the actions of the other de-
positors. The ICC is violated. Therefore, the best panic-based run-permitting
allocation is given by (cwait, Bwait) and the ICC is binding. The corresponding
welfare W˜ (cwait, Bwait; s) is strictly decreasing in s.
As s increases, the probability of a patient depositor receiving an early with-
drawal increases. The incentive for the planner to choose a high deposit contract
and a generous bailout policy decreases. As s gets sufficiently large (s ≥ s2), the
allocation chosen by the planner no longer violates the ICC. The best panic-
based run-permitting allocation is (c˜, B˜) and the ICC is not binding. The corre-
sponding welfare W˜ (c˜, B˜; s) is still strictly decreasing in s.
Numerical examples and detailed explanations for the three cases are in Sec-
tion A.3 of the Appendix.
1.4 The Fiscal Authority with Commitment
This section analyzes the economy in which the fiscal authority is able to commit
to a bailout policy.
This problem can be solved by backward induction, starting from the post-
deposit game, followed by the banks’ decisions and the fiscal authority’s. Given
any allocation (c, B), the outcome in the post-deposit game is identical to the one
in the constrained efficient economy.
The banking industry is assumed to be competitive. The free entry condition
ensures that each bank in the economy maximizes the ex-ante expected utilities
of its depositors from withdrawals. Since all banks are identical, it is sufficient to
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analyze the decision of the representative bank. The representative bank solves
the following problem:
max
c
Wpri(c, B; s) =

Ŵpri(c, B) if (c, B) ∈ Searly
W˜pri(c, B; s) if (c, B) /∈ Searly
subject to (c, B) ∈ Swait. (1.6)
The objective function of the bank is Wpri(c, B; s), which differs from the
ex-ante expected welfare W (c, B; s) in that it excludes the utilities from public
good provision. This is the key to the moral hazard that arises because banks do
not internalize the cost of bailouts, which cost is the distortion between private
consumption and public consumption.
Let c¯∗1(B) denote the solution to problem (1.6). The fiscal authority, when
choosing the bailout policy B, foresees the response of the bank, c¯∗1(B). The
problem of the fiscal authority is given by
max
B
W (c∗1(B), B; s) =

Ŵ (c¯∗1(B), B) if (c¯∗1(B), B) ∈ Searly
W˜ (c¯∗1(B), B; s) if (c¯∗1(B), B) /∈ Searly
subject to (c¯∗1(B), B) ∈ Swait, (1.7)
where Ŵ and W˜ are as defined in (1.2) and (1.3). Let B∗1 denote the solution
to problem (1.7) and c∗1 ≡ c¯∗1(B∗1). The equilibrium allocation under the fiscal
authority with commitment is (c∗1, B∗1).
Proposition 7. The economy in which the fiscal authority can commit is constrained
efficient, except for a measure of run probability s ∈ (s0, s0 + k0) in Case 2 and s ∈
(s1, s1 + k1) in Case 3, where k0 ≥ 0 and k1 ≥ 0.
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As long as the fiscal authority is able make a commitment on bailouts, the
economy is typically constrained efficient. The potential moral hazard that
arises from the failure of the bank to internalize the cost of bailouts can typi-
cally be eliminated.
The intuition is that when the bailout policy is pre-committed by the fiscal
authority, the bank takes the bailout policy as given and realizes that the deposit
contract it sets does not affect the amount of bailout it receives in the event
of a bank run. Another way to see this is that maximizing Ŵpri and Ŵ (W˜pri
and W˜ ) are equivalent since the difference between the two functions Ŵ − Ŵpri
(W˜ − W˜pri) only depends on B, which the bank takes as given. Therefore, there
is usually no moral hazard under the fiscal authority with commitment.
This economy is not constrained efficient only when s is at the lower end of
the range in which the constrained efficient allocation is panic-based run-proof.
The constrained efficient allocation (c∗, B∗) = (cearly, Bearly) cannot be supported
as an equilibrium because the deposit contract set by the bank in response to
bailout policyBearly committed by the fiscal authority is not cearly, or c¯∗1(Bearly) 6=
cearly = c∗. Since the bank does not internalize the cost of bailouts, it is willing
to tolerate a higher panic-based run probability s than the fiscal authority. The
discrepancy in the levels of toleration towards panic-based runs between the
banks and the fiscal authority causes the wedge between the welfare achieved
in this economy and the constrained efficient welfare.
24
1.4.1 Numerical Example
This section includes a numerical example to show the allocation and the wel-
fare of the economy under the fiscal authority with commitment. The numerical
example uses the following parameter values:
R = 1.5 γ = 1.01 D = 1 y = 3 p = 0.5 τ = 0.5. (1.8)
Figure 1.3 shows the equilibrium allocation and the welfare in the economy
under the fiscal authority with commitment and the constrained efficient econ-
omy. A = 1.65 is such that the constrained efficient allocation falls in Case 2.
The wedge between the blue and red plots in Figure 1.3 shows the range
s ∈ (s0, s0+k0) in which the economy under the fiscal auhority is not constrained
efficient. Within this range, the fiscal authority realizes that a panic-based run-
proof contract is optimal. However, since the bank does not internalize the cost
of bailouts, it still prefers to offer a panic-based run-permitting contract. When
this happens, the fiscal authority can either allow the bank to offer a panic-based
run-permitting contract or lower the bailout B to incentivize the bank to offer
a panic-based run-proof contract. Incentivizing the bank is costly. The fiscal
authority has to lower bailout way below the optimal level B∗ in order for the
bank to prefer a panic-based run-proof contract over a run-permitting one (as
seen from the Bailout plot in Figure 1.3).
When s is sufficiently close to s0, the fiscal authority still allows the banks
to offer a panic-based run-permitting contract. The cost of incentivizing the
bank to offer a panic-based run-proof contract outweighs the cost of tolerating
a panic-based run-permitting contract. However, when s gets higher, the cost
of tolerating a panic-based run-permitting contract increases. At the same time,
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the cost of incentivizing the bank to offer a panic-based run-proof contract de-
creases. Higher s forces the bank to be more conservative. The fiscal authority
does not have to lower the bailout amount as far below the optimal level B∗ to
incentivize the bank to offer a panic-based run-proof contract. Therefore, as s
gets sufficiently high above s0, the fiscal authority starts lowering the bailout to
make the bank offer a panic-based run-proof contract. This switch is captured
by the discontinuity in the allocation of the economy under the fiscal authority
with commitment as seen in Figure 1.3.
Notice that once the fiscal authority decides to lower the bailout to incen-
tivize the bank to offer a panic-based run-proof contract, the ex-ante expected
welfare is increasing in s. A higher panic-based run probability does not al-
ways hurt welfare. Higher s induces banks to behave more conservatively, and
consequently decreases moral hazard and increases welfare.
1.5 The Fiscal Authority without Commitment
This section analyzes the economy in which the fiscal authority is unable to
pre-commit to a bailout policy. The fiscal authority chooses the bailout policy
B after they observe that both depositors withdraw in period 1. By backward
induction, the post-deposit game is first analyzed followed by the pre-deposit
game.
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1.5.1 The Post-deposit Game
Taking the deposit contract c as given, the post-deposit game can be solved as an
extensive-form game with imperfect information. The fiscal authority observes
the withdrawal decisions of the depositors but not sunspots and the types of
the depositors. The fiscal authority has to infer sunspots and the types of the
depositors from the withdrawal decisions of the depositors.
Each depositor - if patient - has to choose her withdrawal plan for each of
the two sunspot states. There are three pure strategies for each depositor: (1) to
withdraw late in both states α and β, (2) to withdraw late in state α and early in
state β, or (3) to withdraw early in both states.21
Definition 5. The separating equilibrium in the post-deposit game under the fiscal
authority without commitment is defined as the symmetric separating Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) in which both depositors choose action (2).
Definition 6. The “good” (“bad”) pooling equilibrium in the post-deposit game under
the fiscal authority without commitment is defined as the symmetric pooling Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in which both depositors choose action (1) ((3)).
The Separating Equilibrium
Suppose both depositors - if patient - choose action (2). When the fiscal author-
ity observes that both depositors withdraw early, there is a positive probability
that the second in line is patient. Let p˜ be the conditional probability of the sec-
ond in line being impatient given that both depositors withdraw early, and is
21Without loss of generality, the option for which a patient depositor withdraws early in state
α and late in state β is omitted.
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given by
p˜ =
(1− s)p2 + sp
(1− s)p2 + s .
With probability 1−s, state α realizes and all the patient depositors withdraw
late. The probability of both depositors withdrawing early in this state is p2.
With probability s, state β realizes and all depositors withdraw early regardless
of their types. The probability of both depositors withdrawing early in this
state is 1. In general, the probability of the fiscal authority observing that both
depositors withdraw early is (1− s)p2 + s. The probability of the two depositors
withdrawing early and the second in line being impatient can be derived in a
similar way and is given by (1− s)p2 + sp.
The bailout decision of the fiscal authority is essentially a trade off between
the withdrawal of the second in line and the public good provision. The fiscal
authority’s problem is given by
max
B∈[0,2τy]
p˜u(2(1− τ)y − c+B) + (1− p˜)v(2(1− τ)y − c+B) + 2Γ(2τy −B).
(1.9)
Notice that the utility from the first in line is not in the objective function
because the bailout payment is only used to fund the withdrawal of the sec-
ond in line. The utility from the public good provision appears in the objective
function because the resources for bailouts are taken away from the public good
provision.
Let B∗sep be the solution to (1.9). The bailout response of the fiscal authority
under the assumption that both depositors choose action (2) is given by:
B∗sep(c) = max{2τy −Ksep(2y − c), 0}, (1.10)
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where Ksep is a constant that is positively correlated with the relative weights
on the utility of the public good provision and the utility of the withdrawal of
the second in line ( 2D
p˜A+(1−p˜) ). Notice that the relative weight is a function of s.
Ksep is given by
Ksep =
[
2D
p˜A+(1−p˜)
]1/γ
1 +
[
2D
p˜A+(1−p˜)
]1/γ .
Holding the deposit contract c constant, the bailout response of the fiscal
authority is negatively correlated with s. As s gets larger, the fiscal authority
gets decreasingly certain that the second-in-line depositor is impatient. There-
fore, the amount of resources that the fiscal authority intends to reallocate from
public goods to the withdrawal of the second in line decreases.
When the value of the public good provision is sufficiently high (D is large),
it could be welfare improving for the fiscal authority to have a negative bailout.
This allows the fiscal authority to impose an additional tax on the withdrawal of
the second in line to fund the public good. In this case, the non-negativity con-
straint for the bailout is binding andB∗sep(c) = 0. For the remainder of the paper,
the focus is on the parameter values such that the non-negativity constraint for
B∗sep(c) is non-binding. This ensures that B∗sep(c) > 0.
Lemma 8. If γ < min{2, 1+ln 2/ lnR}, there exists an interval (csep, c¯sep] ⊂ (0, 2(1−
τ)y) such that the separating equilibrium exists in the post-deposit game under the fiscal
authority without commitment if and only if c ∈ (csep, c¯sep].
In order for the fiscal authority’s bailout response B∗sep(c) to be such that it
is incentive compatible for the depositors to choose action (2), the propensity
of the patient depositors to run has to be sufficiently high. This is ensured by
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having a high enough deposit contract c such that a patient depositor is better
off withdrawing early if she believes that the other depositor - if patient - also
withdraws early. The propensity to run also has to be low enough such that
a patient depositor withdraws late if she believes that the other depositor - if
patient - also withdraws late. Lemma 8 suggests that there is a measure of de-
posit contract (csep, c¯sep] that ensures that both conditions are satisfied and the
separating equilibrium exists in the post-deposit game.
The “Good” and “Bad” Pooling Equilibrium
The “good” pooling equilibrium is when both depositors choose action (1),
which is to withdraw late in both states α and β if they are patient. When both
depositors withdraw early, the fiscal authority knows with certainty that the
second in line is impatient (p˜ = 1). The fiscal authority’s problem is given by
max
B∈[0,2τy]
u(2(1− τ)y − c+B) + 2Γ(2τy −B). (1.11)
LetB∗good be the solution to (1.11). The bailout response of the fiscal authority
under the assumption that both depositors choose action (1) is given by
B∗good(c) = max{2τy −Kgood(2y − c), 0}, (1.12)
where Kgood is a constant that is positively correlated with the relative weights
on the utility from public good and the utility from the withdrawal of the
second-in-line (2D
A
). Kgood is given by
Kgood =
(
2D
A
)1/γ
1 +
(
2D
A
)1/γ .
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The bailout response of the fiscal authority is independent of s since the de-
positors’ actions are independent of the sunspot state. The fiscal authority al-
ways knows that the probability of the second in line being impatient is 1.
The analysis of the “bad” pooling equilibrium is similar to the “good” pool-
ing equilibrium. When both depositors choose action (3), they withdraw early
regardless of their types. Therefore, observing two early withdrawals does not
provide the fiscal authority with additional information about the type of the
second in line. The conditional probability of the second in line being impatient
given two early withdrawals is p˜ = p, which is equal to the probability of any
given depositor being impatient.
Lemma 9. If γ < min{2, 1 + ln 2/ lnR}, the “good” (“bad”) pooling equilibrium
exists in the post-deposit game under the fiscal authority without commitment as long
as c ≤ csep (c > c¯sep).
To ensure the existence of the “good” pooling equilibrium in the post-deposit
game, the best response of the fiscal authority on the bailout B∗good(c) has to be
such that it is incentive compatible for the depositors to choose action (1). This
happens when the deposit contract c is low (c ≤ csep) so that the propensity
to run of the patient depositors is low enough such that a patient depositor
withdraws late if she believes that the other depositor is also withdrawing late.
In order for it to be incentive compatible for the depositors to play action (3),
c has to be high enough such that a patient depositor withdraws early if she
believes that the other depositor - if patient - also withdraws early. Figure 1.4
provides a summary of the type of equilibrium that exists for a given deposit
contract c ∈ [0, 2(1− τ)y].
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Figure 1.4: PBEs of the Post-deposit Game
1.5.2 The Pre-deposit Game
Since the bailout policy is decided by the fiscal authority later on when both
depositors in a bank withdraw in period 1, the bank knows that the deposit
contract it offers affects the decision of the fiscal authority on the amount of
bailout. It is clear from the response functions of the fiscal authority in (1.10)
and (1.12) that the bailout response is an increasing function of c. The bank does
not internalize the cost of bailouts but is able to indirectly increase the bailout
amount by increasing c. This is the driving force of moral hazard that arises due
to the lack of commitment of the fiscal authority in this model.
The bank knows that the choice of its deposit contract dictates the type of
equilibrium in the post-deposit game based on Lemma 8 and 9. The representa-
tive bank’s problem is given by
max
c∈[0,c¯sep]

Ŵpri(c, B
∗
good(c)) if c ≤ csep
W˜pri(c, B
∗
sep(c); s) if c > csep
. (1.13)
The bank only maximizes the ex-ante expected utilities of its own depositors
from withdrawals Wpri due to the competitive nature of the banking industry.
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Ŵpri(c, B
∗
good(c)) is the sum of the ex-ante expected utilities from withdrawals
of the two depositors when there is the “good” pooling equilibrium in the post-
deposit game. W˜pri(c, B∗sep(c); s) is the sum of the ex-ante expected utilities from
withdrawals of the two depositors when there is the separating equilibrium in
the post-deposit game. Let c∗2 denote the solution to (1.13).22 The full equilib-
rium characterization can be found in Section A.5 of the Appendix.
Proposition 10. The economy in which the fiscal authority is unable to commit is never
constrained efficient.
The main takeaway from Proposition 10 is that the inability of the fiscal au-
thority to commit to a bailout policy is the main driving force of the moral haz-
ard in the banking industry. If the fiscal authority is able to commit, the outcome
is typically constrained efficient (Proposition 7). The disparity between the com-
mitment case and the non-commitment case is mainly due to the failure of the
bank to internalize the cost of bailouts and the ability of the bank to indirectly
affect the bailout it receives by altering the deposit contract it offers.
1.5.3 Numerical Example
The same parameter values from (1.8) are used. Figure 1.5 shows the equi-
librium outcome in the non-commitment case together with the equilibrium
22There exists a range c ∈ (cgood, csep] such that it is incentive compatible for the depositors to
both choose action (1) or both choose action (3). Choosing action (1) in both sunspot states can
still be supported as an equilibrium. However, it does not give a fair comparison between the
commitment and non-commitment case. This is because in the commitment case, the depositors
are assumed to always play the non-panic equilibrium in α state and panic equilibrium in β state
whenever both equilibria exist. The focus of the parameter values for the remainder of the paper
is such that c∗2 /∈ (cgood, csep]. The detail on the parameter restrictions can be found in Section
A.6 of the Appendix.
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outcomes in the commitment case and the constrained efficient economy when
A = 1.65. The plots of the contract, bailout, and welfare for the non-commitment
case and the constrained efficient economy are identical to Figure 1.3. For the
entire measure of s shown in Figure 1.5, the separating equilibrium exists in the
post-deposit game under the fiscal authority without commitment.
Notice that the deposit contract c is higher under the fiscal authority without
commitment than the one under the fiscal authority with commitment and the
one in the constrained efficient economy. This is due to the bank’s expectation
that the fiscal authority will increase bailout B if it offers a higher deposit con-
tract c. In equilibrium, bailoutB under the fiscal authority without commitment
is also higher than the ones in the other two economies. The ex-ante expected
welfare under the fiscal authority without commitment is strictly lower than
the constrained efficient welfare and the welfare under the fiscal authority with
commitment.
The Cost of Non-commitment
In order to better illustrate the cost of moral hazard under the fiscal authority
with and without commitment, the amounts of additional endowments on top
of y that are required to bring the equilibrium welfare under both cases to the
constrained efficient welfare are computed. Define ∆Cy and ∆NCy respectively as
the corresponding amounts of additional endowments required for each depos-
itor in the commitment and non-commitment case. The difference ∆NCy −∆Cy is
the cost of the inability of the fiscal authority to commit.
Figure 1.6 shows the plot of ∆Cy and ∆NCy using the same parameter values
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Figure 1.5: Equilibrium under Fiscal Authority without Commitment
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from (1.8) and A = 1.65. Notice that ∆Cy is relatively close to or equal to zero
for the entire measure of s. When the fiscal authority is able to commit, the
moral hazard cost is minimal. Also, ∆NCy is strictly increasing in s. As the panic-
based run probability gets larger, the moral hazard cost of the inability of the
fiscal authority to commit increases. For small s, ∆Cy is less responsive to an
increase in s. This is because constrained efficient contract is panic-based run-
permitting while the non-commitment case has the separating equilibrium in
the post-deposit game. In equilibrium, the depositors play the same strategies
in the post-deposit game in both economies. As s gets larger, the constrained
efficient contract switches to panic-based run-proof but the non-commitment
case still has the separating equilibrium in the post-deposit game. The deposi-
tors play a different strategy in each economy. The constrained efficient welfare
is constant in s but the welfare in the non-commitment case is strictly decreasing
in s. Therefore, ∆NCy is more responsive to an increase in s.
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1.6 Controlling Short-term Interest Rates
This section evaluates the efficacy of an additional policy tool for the fiscal au-
thority in eliminating the moral hazard from bailouts.
Since banks tend to offer a deposit contract c higher than the efficient level, it
can be welfare improving if the fiscal authority is able to place an upper bound
on the contract offered by banks.23 The fiscal authority chooses an upper bound
on the deposit contract c¯ right after taxes are collected.
Proposition 11. Suppose the fiscal authority is able to place an upper bound on con-
tracts. When the fiscal authority is able to commit, the economy is always constrained
efficient. When the fiscal authority is unable to commit, the economy is constrained
efficient if s ∈ [0, s¯), where s¯ = 1 if the constrained efficient allocation is in Case 1,
s¯ ∈ (0, s0] in Case 2, and s¯ = 0 in Case 3.
When the fiscal authority is able to commit, the optimal choices for bailout
and the upper bound for contracts are trivial. The fiscal authority chooses
B = B∗ and c¯ = c∗.24 The upper bound for contracts is binding and the bank
chooses c∗. In equilibrium, the allocation is identical to the constrained efficient
allocation. The economy is constrained efficient for s ∈ [0, 1].
When the fiscal authority is unable to commit, the optimal choice for c¯ is less
trivial. Assuming that the fiscal authority chooses the deposit contract on behalf
23Contract is essentially the short-term interest rate offered by the bank. The short-term rate
can be calculated by c(1−τ)y .
24Recall that (c∗, B∗) is the constrained efficient allocation.
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of the bank, the fiscal authority’s problem is given by
c∗optimal ≡ arg max
c∈[0,c¯sep]

Ŵ (c, B∗good(c)) if c ≤ csep
W˜ (c, B∗sep(c); s) if c > csep
. (1.14)
(1.14) differs from (1.13) and in that the ex-ante expected welfare is max-
imized in (1.14) but only the ex-ante expected utilities from withdrawals are
maximized in (1.13). The contract c∗optimal chosen by the fiscal authority gives
the highest possible welfare in the non-commitment case. Naturally, the fiscal
authority’s optimal choice for the upper bound is c¯ = c∗optimal.
25
When A ≤ Aearly (Case 1), the constrained efficient allocation is (ĉ, B̂) and is
panic-based run-proof for s ∈ [0, 1]. The solution to (1.14) is also ĉ. The fiscal
authority’s optimal upper bound for contracts is c¯ = ĉ. Since the bank typically
chooses a deposit contract that is higher than the constrained efficient level, the
upper bound is strictly binding. The bank’s optimal deposit contract is ĉ, which
gives the “good” equilibrium in the post-deposit game. The fiscal authority’s
bailout response in the post-deposit game is B∗good(ĉ) = B̂. The equilibrium
allocation turns out to be (ĉ, B̂), which is identical to the constrained efficient
allocation. Therefore, the economy is constrained efficient for s ∈ [0, 1].
When Aearly < A ≤ Await (Case 2), the constrained efficient allocation is
(c˜, B˜) and is panic-based run-permitting for s ∈ [0, s0). It can be shown that the
solution to (1.14) is also c˜ for s ∈ [0, s¯). The fiscal authority then chooses c˜ as
the upper bound and the bank responds with c˜ since the upper bound is strictly
binding, as shown in Figure 1.5. The equilibrium allocation is (c˜, B˜), which is
identical to the constrained efficient allocation. Therefore, the economy is con-
25It remains to check that when c¯ = c∗optimal, the bank responds by choosing c
∗
optimal. That
ensures that the optimal upper bound of the fiscal authority is c¯ = c∗optimal
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Figure 1.7: “Regulation Q” under Fiscal Authority with Commitment
strained efficient for s ∈ [0, s¯). When s ∈ [s¯, 1], the constrained efficient allo-
cation is (cearly, Bearly). However, cearly is not necessarily the solution to (1.14).
Therefore, the economy is not necessarily constrained efficient.
1.6.1 Numerical Example
The numerical example in this section uses the parameter values as in (1.8) and
A = 1.65. The constrained efficient allocation is in Case 2. Figure 1.7 shows
the equilibrium contract and welfare under the fiscal authority with commit-
ment. Notice that if the fiscal authority is able to impose an upper bound on
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contracts (shown in Figure 1.7 as “w/ Commitment (Q)”), the economy is al-
ways constrained efficient. The measure of s in which the economy is initially
not constrained efficient is generated by the bank setting higher than socially
optimal c. Once the fiscal authority sets c¯ = c∗, the bank is forced to lower its
contract to the constrained efficient level c∗.
Figure 1.8 shows the equilibrium contract, bailout and welfare under the fis-
cal authority without commitment. Notice that when the fiscal authority is able
to impose an upper bound on contracts, the economy is constrained efficient for
small panic-based run probability s ∈ [0, s¯). In this case, s¯ = s0. The economy
is constrained efficient for the entire measure of s such that the constrained effi-
cient allocation is panic-based run-permitting. When s ∈ [s0, 1], the economy is
not necessarily constrained efficient. In this numerical example, it happens that
the economy is not constrained efficient. However, the welfare is still strictly
higher than the case in which the fiscal authority is not able to impose an upper
bound on contracts.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Bailouts do create moral hazard. The model in this paper suggests that moral
hazard can mostly be eliminated if the fiscal authority is able to make a credible
commitment on the bailout policy since most of the welfare loss from moral
hazard comes from the inability of the fiscal authority to commit.
In practice, it can be difficult for the fiscal authority to credibly commit.
Therefore, additional policy tools are necessary to reduce the moral hazard aris-
ing from bailouts. This model suggests that controlling short-term interest rates
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set by the banks can reduce the welfare loss from moral hazard. It is particularly
effective when the probability of a bank run is low, which is generally the case
in economies with developed financial system, such as the OECD countries.
Keister (2016) compared the bailout regime (similar to the fiscal authority
without commitment) to the no-bailout regime (similar to the fiscal author-
ity with commitment but instead of committing to an ex-ante optimal level of
bailout, the fiscal authority commits to zero bailout). He found that even though
bailouts create moral hazard, a commitment to zero-bailout policy is not always
superior. This paper goes in a different direction and focuses on the welfare loss
that comes solely from the inability of the fiscal authority to commit to a bailout
policy.
This model also suggests that the cost of the inability of the fiscal author-
ity to commit to a bailout policy is increasing in the probability of bank runs.
Economies with an unstable financial system, which is particularly common in
underdeveloped countries, suffer a greater cost from moral hazard. Therefore,
restrictive regulations on financial institutions are essential more so in underde-
veloped countries than developed countries.
This model assumes that taxes are exogenous. The model can be generalized
to the case in which the tax rate is chosen endogenously by the fiscal authority.
This could be a potential future research. However, preliminary numerical ex-
ercises have shown that the qualitative results of this model preserve after this
generalization.
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CHAPTER 2
THE OPTIMAL BAILOUT POLICY IN AN INTERBANK NETWORK
2.1 Introduction
The concern and skepticism regarding the bailouts of financial institutions at
the expense of tax payers have been rising especially since the financial crisis
of 2008. Arguments against bailouts based predominantly on the huge cost of
these bailout packages and the future incentive of financial institutions to ex-
ploit such action from the government. On the other hand, the arguments for
bailouts stand on the fact that the insolvencies of financial institutions are of-
ten “temporary” and that bailouts are essential to back these financial institu-
tions over a brief rough patch. Additionally, by maintaining solvencies in fail-
ing financial institutions, bailouts prevent negative spillovers to other solvent
financial institutions that could potentially induce a larger financial crisis. In
the financial crisis of 2008, the arguments agaist the refusal to bailout Lehman
Brothers were established on the fact that the failure of Lehman had created
spillovers that caused multiple other financial institutions to fail. It also cre-
ated major distrusts in the financial sector, which eventually led to the financial
crisis.
The model in this paper aims to highlight three motivations behind bailouts
of financial institutions: redistribution of resources between private and pub-
lic consumption, prevention of costly bankruptcies, and prevention of negative
spillovers. This model focuses on the decision making of and the trade-off faced
by the fiscal authority regarding the level of bailouts made to financial instuti-
tions during a financial crisis. The results of this paper agree with the arguments
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supporting bailouts, particularly on the benefits they generate from preventing
negative spillovers from insolvent to solvent financial institutions.
This paper, however, does not take into consideration the moral hazard that
arise from the expectation of the financial institutions to receive bailouts during
a financial crisis. It also does not consider the advantages of building a tough
reputation of the fiscal authority by restricting bailouts to break the common
“too big to fail” belief among financial institutions. The unwillingness of the
government to provide a bailout to Lehman Brothers in 2008 provided a huge
lesson to the financial sector that big financial institutions do not always receive
bailouts from the government when they fail, though this lesson had lost its
essence due to the enormous bailout package that came later in the crisis.
The main result of this paper is that partial bailouts are often optimal due to
the advantages of bailouts from bankruptcy and spillover preventions. A key
parameter in the model that dictates the optimal level of bailout is the cost of
bailout. A high cost of bailout can be interpreted as a high valuation of public
good consumption such that taking resources away from public goods to fund
bailouts creates a huge welfare loss. It is intuitive that when the cost of bailout
is sufficiently low, it is optimal for the fiscal authority to provide a full bailout,
which covers all the losses incurred by the failing financial institutions. On the
other hand, with a sufficiently high cost of bailout, the zero bailout policy is
optimal. There exists an intermediate range of the cost of bailout such that it is
optimal for the fiscal authority to cover a fraction of the losses incurred by the
failing financial institutions. Within this range, there exists a positive measure
of the cost of bailout such that the optimal level of bailout is exactly sufficient
to prevent a spillover such that the failure of one financial institution does not
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cause another financial institution to fail. This highlights the significance of rec-
ognizing the role of bailouts in preventing financial spillovers, which strength-
ens the arguments against the failure to bailout Lehman Brothers during the
financial crisis.1
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the interbank network
environment, Section 3 introduces the financial crisis into the model, Section
4 analyzes the optimal bailout of the fiscal authority, Section 5 concludes the
paper. The proofs of all Lemmas are in the Appendix.
2.2 The Banking Environment
There are two banks denoted {A,B}. There is an investment technology that
gives 1 at t = 1 or R > 1 at t = 2 for each unit of consumption good invested at
t = 0. There are two states of the world {S1, S2} that realizes at t = 1. We can
assume that each state realizes with equal positive probability but this could be
generalized to any positive probabilities. At each state, exactly one of the two
banks incurs a loss where a fraction σ¯ ∈ [0, 1] of its investment becomes worth-
less. We can denote σA and σB as the proportion of investment that has become
worthless at t = 1 for banks A and B respectively. The states are summarized in
Table 2.1.
Each bank has a measure of depositors each of whom has probability pi of
turning impatient at t = 1 and probability 1 − pi of turning patient at t = 1.
Denote x1 as the withdrawal at t = 1 and x2 as the withdrawal at t = 2. The
1There also exists a positive measure of the cost of bailouts such that the optimal level of
bailout is exactly sufficient to prevent the failing financial institution to become insolvent. This
is to emphasize the role of bailouts in preventing costly bankruptcies.
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State σA σB
S1 σ¯ 0
S2 0 σ¯
Table 2.1: States
utility of an impatient depositor is u(x1) and of a patient depositor is u(x1 + x2)
where u is a twice continuously differentiable function satisfying u′ > 0 and
u′′ < 0.2
2.2.1 Social Planner
Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the economy as a whole always has
1 − σ¯
2
portion of investment that has not become worthless at t = 1. The social
planner’s problem is
max
c1,c2
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2)
subject to (1− pi)c2 ≤
(
1− σ¯
2
− pic1
)
R, (2.1)
which can be rewritten as
max
c1
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u
((
1− σ¯
2
− pic1
)
R
1− pi
)
. (2.2)
The first order condition is
u′(c1) = Ru′
((
1− σ¯
2
− pic1
)
R
1− pi
)
= Ru′(c1). (2.3)
Since R > 1 and u′′ < 0, it can be inferred that c2 > c1, which means that the
incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied by the social planner’s allocation.3
2The distinction between a patient and an impatient depositor is on the timing of the demand
for consumption. An impatient depositor only derives utility from consumption in t = 1, while
a patient depositor is indifferent between consumption in t = 1 or t = 2.
3The incentive compatibility constraint is said to be satisfied if the bank pays its patient
depositors in t = 2 at least as much as it pays its impatient depositors in t = 1.
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Let c1 and c2 denote the social planner’s allocation for the remainder of the pa-
per.
2.2.2 Decentralized Economy and Risk Sharing
There is a potential benefit from risk sharing between bank A and bank B in the
decentralized economy because the risks they face are perfectly negatively cor-
related. To perfectly risk share, the two banks could enter a contract in which
the bank with σk = σ¯ can claim either σ¯2 at t = 1,
σ¯
2
R at t = 2 or any linear combi-
nation of the two from the other bank with σk = 0. This way, the decentralized
economy can achieve the welfare of the social planner. For both banks, each
impatient depositor receives c1 and each patient depositor receives c2. Without
loss of generality, the following analysis focuses on state S1, in which σA = σ¯
and σB = 0.
Case 1: σ¯ ≤ 1− pic1
In this case, σ¯ is sufficiently small such that bank A still has enough resources
to pay all the impatient depositors c1 at t = 1. Both banks liquidate pic1 of their
total investment to pay their respective impatient depositors. At t = 2, bank A
has [(1 − σ¯) − pic1]R available from its own investment and, under the contract
with bank B, can claim σ¯
2
R from bank B. The total amount of resources available
for patient depositors in bank A is [1 − σ¯
2
− pic1]R. On the other hand, bank B
has (1 − pic1)R available from its own investment but, under the contract with
bank A, it has to pay bank A σ¯
2
R. The total amount of resources available for
patient depositors in bank B is also [1 − σ¯
2
− pic1]R. This means that all patient
depositors, regardless of which bank they deposited in, receive c2 =
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
1−pi
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at t = 2. The social planner’s allocation is identical to the equilibrium allocation
in the decentralized economy.
Case 2: 1− pic1 < σ¯ ≤ 2(1− pic1)
Since σ¯ is large enough such that bank A cannot afford to pay all its mpatient
depositors c1 at t = 1, it has to withdraw the remaining amount pic1 − (1 − σ¯)
from bank B. That gives bank A just enough resources at t = 1 to meet its liabili-
ties pic1. On the other hand, bank B has to liquidate pic1 of its investment to meet
the demand of the impatient depositors and another pic1 − (1 − σ¯) for bank A.
The total liquidation for bank B is 2pic1−(1−σ¯).4 At t = 2, bank A has 0 left from
its own investment and is entitled to claim
[
σ¯
2
− [pic1 − (1 − σ¯)]
]
R from bank B.
The total amount of resources available for patient depositors in bank A is then
[1 − σ¯
2
− pic1]R. Bank B has [1 − 2pic1 + (1 − σ¯)]R available from its own invest-
ment at t = 2. After paying [1− σ¯
2
−pic1]R to bank A, it has [1− σ¯2 −pic1]R left for
its own patient depositors. Therefore, all patient depositors in the economy re-
ceives c2 =
(
1− σ¯
2
−pic1
)
R
1−pi at t = 2. Again, the incentive compatibility constraint is
satisfied and the social planner’s allocation can be supported as the equilibrium
allocation in the decentralized economy.
2.2.3 Bank Runs and Bankruptcies
To simplify the model, it is assumed that a bank run only happens when patient
depositors anticipate that they will receive less than c1 even if they believe that
all other patient depositors will withdraw at t = 2. In other words, there is no
4Since c1 is chosen by the social planner, it has to satisfy 2pic1 − (1 − σ¯) ≤ 1. Otherwise,
there is not enough resources in the entire economy to even satisfy only the need of the patient
depositors. This means that σ¯ > 2(1− pic1) will never happen.
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run on the bank as long as the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. In
the language of sunspot, the sunspot probability in this model is zero, which
eliminates the possibility of multiple equilibria and panic-based bank runs.5
There are two ways for a bank to go into bankruptcy. The first way is that
there is not enough resources available to the bank at t = 1 to satisfy all the
impatient depositors even if it liquidates all its investments and withdraws all
its claims the other bank. This happens when the amount of resources in the
bank is less than pic1 at t = 1. The second way is that the bank anticipates
that its remaining resources after paying impatient depositors in t = 1, together
with any possible claims that it has on other banks at t = 2, are not enough
to pay each patient depositor at least c1 at t = 2. The second way is basically
saying that the bank will also go into bankruptcy if it fails to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint.
When a bank goes into bankruptcy, it liquidates all its investments and
claims on the bank at t = 1, and evenly distributes the available resources
to all its depositors. If the other bank has a claim on the bank that goes into
bankruptcy, the remaining resources have to be shared proportionately between
the depositors and the other bank.
2.3 Financial Crisis
A financial crisis in this model is defined as an unanticipated shock ε > 0 on the
investment of one of the two banks, on top of the anticipated shock σ discussed
earlier. Since this shock is unanticipated, all agents in the economy, including
5Similar assumption has been made in Allen and Gale (2000)
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State σA σB
S1 σ¯ 0
S2 0 σ¯
S3 σ¯ + ε 0
S4 σ¯ ε
S5 ε σ¯
S6 0 σ¯ + ε
Table 2.2: States including Financial Crisis
the social planner, perceive that the ex-ante probability of this unanticipated
shock occuring is zero. The financial crisis can be formally written as four addi-
tional states, as shown in Table 2.2.
States S1 and S2 are both anticipated to occur with positive probabililities
while states S3, S4, S5, and S6 are anticipated to occur with zero probability.
Since states S3 and S4 are symmetrical to states S5 and S6, without loss of gen-
erality, the remainder of this paper focuses only on states S3 and S4.
2.3.1 State S3
Define ck1 and ck2 as the amount paid by bank k to its impatient and patient de-
positors respectively, where k ∈ {A, B}.
Case 1: ε ≤ 1− σ¯ − pic1
Since bank A has enough resources from liquidating its investments to satisfy
the payments to impatient depositors, bank A does not make any withdrawals
from bank B. Both banks liquidate pic1 of their own investments at t = 1 to pay
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their respective impatient depositors. At t = 2, bank A has (1 − σ¯ − ε − pic1)R
and withdraws σ¯
2
R from bank B. Each patient depositor in bank A receives
(1− σ¯
2
−ε−pic1)R
1−pi . To satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint of the patient de-
positors, it has to be the case that patient depositors receive at least as much as
c1, which is equivalent to when
ε ≤ 1− σ¯
2
− (1− pi
R
+ pi)c1. (2.4)
If condition (2.4) is violated, bank A has to go into bankruptcy and liquidate all
its investments and claims on bank B in t = 1. The total amount available for
bank A after liquidation is 1− σ¯
2
− ε, which is also the amount each impatient or
patient depositor receives. Regardless of whether bank A goes into bankruptcy,
bank B is still able to pay c1 to each of its impatient depositors and c2 to each of
its patient depositors.
Case 2: 1− σ¯ − pic1 < ε ≤ 1− σ¯2 − pic1
In this case, bank A does not have enough investment to liquidate to pay pic1 to
its impatient depositors unless it withdraws some of its claims on bank B. The
amount bank A withdraws from bank B is pic1−(1−σ¯−ε). At t = 2, bank A’s only
available resources is its remaining claim on bank B, which is (1− σ¯
2
− ε−pic1)R.
Each patient depositor in bank A receives (1−
σ¯
2
−ε−pic1)R
1−pi , which is the same as in
Case 1. Similar to Case 1, bank B is also able to pay c1 and c2 to its impatient and
patient depositors respectively.
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Case 3: ε > 1− σ¯
2
− pic1
In this case, bank A cannot afford to pay each of its impatient depositors c1 even
if it withdraws all its claims on bank B. Bank A goes into bankruptcy and each
depositor receives 1− σ¯
2
− ε. Bank B remains completely solvent just like in the
previous two cases.
The outcome in State S3 can be summarized as follows:
cA1 (ε) =

c1 ε ≤ 1− σ¯2 − (1−piR + pi)c1
1− σ¯
2
− ε ε > 1− σ¯
2
− (1−pi
R
+ pi)c1
,
cA2 (ε) =

(1− σ¯
2
−ε−pic1)R
1−pi ε ≤ 1− σ¯2 − (1−piR + pi)c1
1− σ¯
2
− ε ε > 1− σ¯
2
− (1−pi
R
+ pi)c1
,
cB1 (ε) = c1,
cB2 (ε) = c2. (2.5)
Notice that for any ε ∈ [0, 1 − σ¯], bank B remains unaffected by the financial
crisis. There is no contagion in state S3.
2.3.2 State S4
The analysis in this section is restricted to the case where σ¯ ≤ 1 − pic1 such that
Bank A does not have to depend on withdrawals from Bank B to fulfil its early
liabilities to its depositors at t = 1.
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Case 1: ε > 1− pic1
When ε is within this range, the unanticipated shock is so large that bank B does
not have enough resources even if it liquidates all its remaining investment.
Bank B then goes into bankruptcy. Each depositor in bank B receives 2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
and bank A recieves (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
. It is easy to show that for ε this large, it is always
true that pic1 >
(1−)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
such that Bank A depletes its entire withdrawal from
Bank B from fulfilling its liabilities to its impatient depositors at t = 1. Bank
A is able to pay each of its patient depositor 1
1−pi
[
1 − σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
− pic1
]
R. The
incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied for Bank A if its patient depositors’
withdrawals in t = 2 is at least as much as its impatient depositors’ withdrawals
in t = 1. This happens if and only if
ε ≤ 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[(
1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
. (2.6)
Otherwise, cA1 > cA2 and bank A has to go into bankruptcy.
Case 2: ε ≤ 1− pic1
Since both ε and σ¯ are sufficiently small, both banks are able to use their own
investment liquidation to fulfill their liabilities to their respective depositors at
t = 1. At t = 2, bank B has to pay a total of (1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R to its patient depositors
and σ¯
2
R to bank A. The total amount of liabilities is (1 − pic1)R, which is larger
than the amount of remaining resources bank B has (1−pic1−ε)R. The reamining
resources has to be divided proportionately to the patient depositors and bank
A. Each patient depositor receives 1
1−pi
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)(1−ε−pic1)R
1−pic1 while bank A receives
1−ε−pic1
1−pic1
σ¯
2
R. Bank B satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint if and only if
ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R
]
. (2.7)
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Suppose (2.7) holds such that Bank B is able to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint. Bank A has (1 − σ¯ − pic1)R remaining from its own investment at
t = 2. Together with 1−ε−pic1
1−pic1
σ¯
2
R it receives from bank B, it has a total of (1− σ¯ −
pic1)R+
1−ε−pic1
1−pic1
σ¯
2
R. Each patient depositor in bank A receives 1
1−pi
[
(1−σ¯−pic1)R+
1−ε−pic1
1−pic1
σ¯
2
R
]
. Bank A can then satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint if and
only if
ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
2
σ¯
(
1−
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1
)
− 1
]
. (2.8)
Lemma 12. If σ¯ ≤ 1−pic1, Bank A does not go into bankruptcy as long as Bank B does
not go into bankruptcy.6
Now suppose that (2.7) is violated such that Bank B does go into
bankcruptcy. Bank B’s investments are divided proportionately among its de-
positors and Bank A. Each depositor in bank B receives 2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
and bank A
receives (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
.
Notice that the amount received by bank A is no longer in the investment
technology. If bank A does not use up this amount at t = 1, the amount will not
be compounded by R at t = 2. If pic1 ≥ (1−ε)σ¯2c1+σ¯ or equivalently ε ≥ 1 − pic1 2c1+σ¯σ¯ ,
bank A depletes the resources it receives from bank B when making payments
to its impatient depositors at t = 1.
Lemma 13. When Bank B goes into bankruptcy, Bank A always depletes the resources
it receives from Bank B from paying its patient depositors if and only if
σ¯ ≤ (1− pic1) 2pic1R
(1− pic1)(1− pi) + pic1 .
7 (2.9)
6Lemma 12 is mathematically equivalent to (1−pic1)
[
2
σ¯
(
1−( 1−piR +pi)c1)−1] ≥ (1−pic1)[1−
(1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯2−pic1)R
]
as long as σ¯ ≤ 1− pic1
7Lemma 13 is mathematically equivalent to (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯2−pic1)R
] ≥ 1− pic1 2c1+σ¯σ¯ if and
only if σ¯ ≤ (1− pic1) 2pic1R(1−pic1)(1−pi)+pic1
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If (2.9) holds, Bank A has to liquidate pic1 − (1−ε)σ¯2c1+σ¯ of its investment to fulfill
the liabilities for its impatient depositors at t = 1. Bank A is then able to pay
1
1−pi
(
1 − σ¯ − pic1 + (1−ε)σ¯2c1+σ¯
)
R to each of its patient depositors at t = 2. Bank A
satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint if and only if
ε ≤ 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[(
1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
. (2.10)
The analysis in thie section focuses on the more interesting case in which
there exists a range of unanticipated shock ε such that Bank B goes into
bankruptcy but Bank A does not. The parameter combinations that satisfy
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R
]
< 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
(2.11)
ensure the existence of such range of ε.
Assume that σ¯ ≤ 1 − pic1, (2.9), and (2.11) hold for the remainder of the
paper.8 This ensures that Bank A does not go into bankruptcy unless Bank B
does. It also ensures that when Bank B goes into bankruptcy and Bank A does
not, Bank A’s total payment to its patient depositors is always larger than the
amount Bank A receives from the bankruptcy liquidation of Bank B.
8Section B.1 in the Appendix analyzes the outcome when (2.9) or (2.11) does not hold.
58
The outcome in State S4 can be summarized as follows:
cA1 (ε) =

c1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
c1 if
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
< ε ≤ 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
if ε > 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
cA2 (ε) =

c2 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
1
1−pi
(
1− σ¯ − pic1 + (1−ε)σ¯2c1+σ¯
)
R if
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
< ε ≤ 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
if ε > 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
cB1 (ε) =

c1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
cB2 (ε) =

1
1−pi
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)(1−ε−pic1)R
1−pic1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
] . (2.12)
When ε ≤ (1 − pic1)
[
1 − (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
, the unanticipated shock is sufficiently
small such that Bank B can still satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint and
thus does not go into bankruptcy. Each impatient depositor in Bank B receives c1
at t = 1 and each patient depositor in Bank B receives the return of the remaining
investment 1
1−pi
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)(1−ε−pic1)R
1−pic1 at t = 2. According to Lemma 12, Bank A also
does not go into bankruptcy. Each impatient depositor receives c1 at t = 1.
Since Bank A receives the full σ¯
2
R from Bank B at t = 2, it is able to pay each of
its patient depositor c2.
When (1−pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
< ε ≤ 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+pi
)
c1− (1− σ¯)
]
, Bank B
fails to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint and goes into bankruptcy.
After liquidation at t = 1, each depositor in Bank B receives 2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
and Bank
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A receives (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
from Bank B. According to Lemma 13, Bank A’s total payment
to its impatient depositors pic1 is larger than the amount it receives from Bank
B. Therefore, Bank A has to liquidate some of its own investment at t = 1 to be
able to pay each of its impatient depositor c1. Each patient depositor in Bank A
ends up receiving 1
1−pi
(
1− σ¯ − pic1 + (1−ε)σ¯2c1+σ¯
)
R.
When ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
, Bank B fails to satisfy the incentive com-
patibility constraint and goes into bankruptcy. In this case, the unanticipated
shock is large enough such that Bank B’s bankruptcy causes Bank A to fail to
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint and has to go into bankruptcy as
well. This is the contagion effect that causes Bank A, which is not hit by the
unanticipated shock, to fail merely because of its connection to Bank B. After
liquidation, each depositor in Bank B receives 2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
and Bank A receives (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
from Bank B. Since Bank A also goes into bankruptcy, each depositor in bank A
receives 1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
after Bank A’s liquidation.
The analyses of the parameter combinations that violate (2.9), or (2.11) can
be found in section B.1 of the Appendix.
2.4 Fiscal Authority
This section adds the role of fiscal authority into the economy. For simplicity,
assume that each depositor is endowed with y units of consumption good and
the utility function u satisfies u′(λc1) = Ru′(λc2) for any λ > 0.9
The fiscal authority collects an exogenous lump-sum tax τ ∈ [0, y] from the
9The CRRA utility function satisfies this property.
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endowments of the depositors. Each depositor ends up with after-tax income
of yd = y − τ . The tax revenue is used by the fiscal authority to invest in the
technology to provide public good g at t = 2. Each depositor derives utility
from public good. The utility is described byDv(g), whereD > 0 is the measure
of the value of the public good provision to the depositors. Also, assume that
v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0.
2.4.1 Financial Crisis and Optimal Bailout
During a financial crisis, an unexpected shock hits one of the two banks in the
economy. The fiscal authority does not have additional channels to raise more
taxes after a financial crisis hits. However, it could potentially be welfare im-
proving for the fiscal authority to divert some of the tax revenue to fund the
bailout for the bank hit by the unanticipated shock. The fiscal authority chooses
the fraction of distressed assets to bailout b ∈ [0, ε]. The fiscal authority then
transfers ydb of its investment to the bank hit by the unexpected shock.
Notice that ε is the fraction of assets that becomes worthless after the unan-
ticipated shock hits a bank and b is the fraction of assets being transferred by
the fiscal authority from tax revenue to the bank hit by the shock. The function
cit(ε) for t = 1, 2 and i = A,B from (2.12) shows the withdrawals of the patient
and impatient depositors in Banks A and B respectively for each unit of con-
sumption good deposited in t = 0. As long as u′(λc1) = Ru′(λc2) holds, the
withdrawals for the depositors can simply be scaled by ydcit(ε) if the depositors
deposit yd units of consumption good at t = 0.
Once the fiscal authority agrees to compensate b fraction of assets to the
61
bank hit by the unanticipated shock, the withdrawals of the depositors is simply
ydc
i
t(ε−b). To save b fraction of distress assets, the fiscal authority has to transfer
ydb units of its investment in the technology to the bank hit by the shock. That
leaves (2τ − ydb)R units of consumption good going into public goods at t = 2.
The fiscal authority chooses the fraction of distressed assets b to compensate
the bank hit by the unanticipated shock to maximize the overall welfare of the
economy. The overall welfare is the total utility of the depositors in Banks A
and B from withdrawals and public good consumption. The fiscal authority’s
problem is the following:
max
b∈[0,ε]
pi
[
u(ydc
A
1 (ε− b)) + u(ydcB1 (ε− b)
]
+ (1− pi)[u(ydcA2 (ε− b)) + u(ydcB2 (ε− b))]+ 2Dv((2τ − ydb)R).
(2.13)
The welfare function in (2.13) shows the trade-off faced by the fiscal author-
ity between subsidizing private withdrawals and providing public goods. The
withdrawals of the depositors for any given bailout level b ∈ [0, ε] in State S3
and S4 are described in (2.5) and (2.12) respectively.
In State S3, there is no contagion since both the anticipated and unantici-
pated shocks hit Bank A. In addition to reallocating resources between public
good and private withdrawals, the bailout also serves as a way to avoid costly
bankruptcy. Depending on the parameter D, it could be optimal for the fiscal
authority to provide Bank A with a full bailout b = ε, a zero bailout b = 0, or a
partial bailout b ∈ (0, ε). The interesting case is when a partial bailout is optimal.
In particular, it is often optimal for the fiscal authority to provide the amount of
bailout that is just enough to prevent Bank A to go into bankruptcy.
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In State S4, there is a potential contagion effect from Bank B to bank A.
In addition to the two functions that bailouts serve in State S3, bailouts also
serve to prevent financial contagion. Depending on the parameter D, it could
be optimal for the fiscal authority to provide the amount of bailout that is just
enough to prevent the contagion effect from Bank B to Bank A. With a measure
of smaller values ofD, it could also be optimal for the fiscal authority to provide
the amount of bailout that is enough to prevent the contagion effect and Bank
B from bankruptcy. Further details on the optimal bailout amount is discussed
with the numerical examples in the next section.
2.4.2 Numerical Examples
This section shows a simple numerical example to visualize the optimal bailout
policy. The examples that follow assume CRRA utility functions for the utilities
of the depositors from withdrawals and public good consumptions:
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ ,
v(g) =
g1−γ
1− γ .
State S3:
In State S3, Bank A is hit by both the anticipated and unanticipated shocks.
There is no spillover effect in this state since Bank B is perfectly healthy. De-
pending on the size of the unanticipated shock, Bank A might or might not go
into bankruptcy. If the unanticipated shock is sufficiently large such that Bank A
goes bankrupt, on top of allowing for redistribution of resources between public
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Figure 2.1: Optimal bailout in State S3
and private consumption, the bailout also serves to avoid costly bankruptcy.
The following parameter values are used:
R = 1.5 γ = 1.01 y = 3 pi = 0.5 σ¯ = 0.4 ε = 0.5 τ = 1.5.
The parameter values are chosen such that the numerical example shows all the
qualitative cases in state S3. Figure 2.1 shows the plot of the optimal bailout
against the value of public good D. Notice that the optimal bailout level is non-
increasing in D, which is not a surprising result.
When D is sufficiently small, the value of public good consumption is low.
It is optimal for the fiscal authority to provide a full bailout to Bank A since
the cost of bailout is low. The cost of bailout increases as D increases. For
an intermediate range of D, it is optimal for the fiscal authority to offer a par-
tial bailout to Bank A, or b ∈ (0, ε). Notice that there is a horizontal portion
and a discontinuity in the plot in Figure 2.1. The horizontal portion of the plot
shows the amount of bailout that is just sufficient to prevent Bank A from go-
ing into bankruptcy. Since avoiding bankruptcy gives additional welfare to
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the economy, there is a discountinuity in the welfare function with respect to
bailout b. That explains the horizontal portion of the plot such that as D in-
creases, the optimal bailout stays at the same level because of the additional
welfare from bankruptcy prevention. However, as D keeps increasing, there is
a point in which the cost of bailout overshadows the welfare improvement from
bankruptcy prevention. The bailout amount jumps down to a lower level at this
point which creates the discontinuity in the plot of bailout b against the value of
public consumption D.
This example explains the motivation behind partial bailouts provided by
the fiscal authority. In addition to having the advantage of a redistribution of
resources between private and public consumption, there is also an additional
incentive from bankruptcy prevention. The flat portion of Figure 2.1 highlights
the additional motivation such that even as the cost of bailout increases, the
optimal level of bailout remains constant because the additional cost is offset by
the additional benefit from bankruptcy prevention.
State S4:
In State S4, Bank A is hit by the anticipated shock and Bank B by the unantic-
ipated shock. There is a potential spillover effect from Bank B to Bank A for a
sufficiently large unanticipated shock ε. In this case, the bailout has an addi-
tional benefit, which is spillover prevention. By bailing out Bank B, the fiscal
authority can potentially prevent the negative spillover that causes Bank A to
go into bankruptcy even when Bank A is not hit by the unanticipated shock.
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Figure 2.2: Optimal bailout in State S4
This example uses the following parameter values:
R = 1.5 γ = 1.01 y = 3 pi = 0.5 σ¯ = 0.4 ε = 0.85 τ = 1.5.
The parameter values are chosen such that the example covers all the qualitative
cases in State S4. Notice that there are two flat portions in the plot of optimal
bailout against D in Figure 2.2.
When D is sufficiently small, a full bailout b = ε is optimal; when D is suffi-
ciently large, a zero bailout b = 0 is optimal. The first flat portion of the plot in
Figure 2.2 (around D = 2) is generated by the additional benefit of bailout from
spillover prevention. This is the amount of bailout such that it is exactly suffi-
ciently to prevent Bank A from going bankrupt because of the spillover effect
from Bank B. This amount of bailout provides just enough resources to Bank B
such that Bank B’s payment to Bank A is large enough for Bank A to remain
solvent. Notice that there is a discontinuity at the right end of this flat portion
of the plot. This is when the benefit from spillover prevention is overshadowed
by the increasing cost of bailout as D increases.
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The second flat portion of the plot in Figure 2.2 (around D = 4) is generated
by the additional incentive of the fiscal authority to bailout to prevent Bank B
from going into bankruptcy. The explanation behind this segment is similar to
State S3.
This example shows that a partial bailout policy by the fiscal authority can be
motivated by spillover prevention. This example also strengthens the argument
against the reluctance of the Fed to bailout Lehman Brothers in the 2008 crisis.
It was believed that the failure of Lehman Brothers has caused severe negative
spillovers to the financial sector and that the financial crisis could have been
prevented if the Fed were to bailout Lehman Brothers in the early stage of the
crisis.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper intends to highlight the different motivations behind bailouts in an
interbank network: the redistribution of resources between private and public
consumption, bankruptcy prevention, and spillover prevention. It also stresses
the significance of determining the optimal bailout levels to financial institu-
tions based on the goals or motivations behind the bailout payments.
In the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of Lehman Brothers had led to the fail-
ures of multiple financial institutions that were closely linked to Lehman. The
decision not to bailout Lehman Brothers has been heavily critisized based on
the argument that the financial crisis might have been prevented if the govern-
ment had decided to save Lehman Brothers from failing. As suggested by this
model, the motivation to bailout Lehman Brothers could come from the preven-
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tion of the institution to go into costly bankruptcy, or the prevention of negative
spillovers to other financial institutions. The decision not to bailout Lehman
Brothers could be induced by the failure to acknowledge the latter motivation.
The design of this model remains simple to highlight the different motiva-
tions behind partial bailouts. Due to the simplicity, the potential moral haz-
ard issues from bailouts is ommitted. It does not allow for the exploitation of
bailouts by banks, nor does it allow for the exploitation of banks on the poten-
tial bailouts to be received by other banks, as in Eisert and Eufinger (2016). This
leaves rooms for potential future works.
68
References
1. Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2000) “Financial Contagion” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 108, 1-33.
2. Diamond, D.W. and Dybvig, P.H. (1983)“Bank runs, deposit insurance,
and liquidity” Journal of Political Economy, 91, 401-419.
3. Eisert, T. and Eufinger, C. “Interbank networks and backdoor bailouts:
Benefiting from other banks government guarantees”, Management Sci-
ence, forthcoming.
4. Ennis, H. and Keister, T. (2016) “Optimal banking contracts and financial
fragility” Economic Theory, 61, 335-363.
5. Goldstein, I. and Pauzner, A. (2005) “Demand deposit contracts and the
probability of bank runs” Journal of Finance, 60, 1293-1327.
6. Keister, T. (2016) “Bailouts and Financial Fragility” Review of Economic
Studies, 83, 704-736.
7. Keister, T. and Mitkov, Y. (2017) “Bailouts, bail-ins and banking crises”,
working paper.
8. Keister, T. and Narasiman, V. (2016) “Expectation vs. fundamental-based
bank runs: when should bailouts be permitted?” Review of Economic Dy-
namics, 21, 89-104.
9. Leitner, Y. (2005) “Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Pri-
vate Sector Bailouts”, Journal of Finance, 60, 2925-2953.
10. Peck, J. and Shell, K. (2003) “Equilibrium bank runs” Journal of Political
Economy, 111, 103-123.
69
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 The Post-deposit Game of the Constrained Efficient Econ-
omy
The action set of each depositor in the post-deposit game is {E,L}, where E (L)
stands for withdrawing early (late). An impatient depositor always chooses E.
Thus, the relevant strategy for a depositor is (E,E) and (L,E), where the first
(second) element in the parenthesis stands for the action chosen by the depositor
when she is patient (impatient). The expected utilities can be summarized in the
payoff matrix below.
(E,E) (L,E)
(E,E) T1, T1 T3, T2
(L,E) T2, T3 T4, T4
where
T1 = (1− p)v(c) + v(2(1− τ)y − c+B)
2
+ p
u(c) + u(2(1− τ)y − c+B)
2
T2 = (1− p)v((2(1− τ)y − c)R) + pu(c) + u(2(1− τ)y − c+B)
2
T3 = (1− p)
[
(1− p)v(c) + pv(c) + v(2(1− τ)y − c+B)
2
]
+ p
[
(1− p)u(c) + pu(c) + u(2(1− τ)y − c+B)
2
]
T4 = (1− p)
[
(1− p)v((1− τ)yR) + pv((2(1− τ)y − c)R)]
+ p
[
(1− p)u(c) + pu(c) + u(2(1− τ)y − c+B)
2
]
(A.1)
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T1 is the ex-ante expected utility of a depositor for playing (E,E) when the
other depositor plays (E,E). With probability (1 − p), the depositor is patient
and her utility is given by v. With probability p, the depositor is impatient and
her utility is given by u. In both cases, the depositor can either be the first or
second in the line with equal probability 1/2. The depositor receives c if she
is the first in the line. If she is the second in the line, she receives the leftover
resources 2(1− τ)y− c. Since both depositors withdraw early, the depositor also
receives the bailout payment B. The total withdrawal of the depositor if she is
the second in the line is 2(1− τ)y− c+B. The derivation of T2, T3 and T4 can be
done in similar fashion.
If T2 ≥ T1 and T4 ≥ T3, (L,E) is the dominant strategy for both deposi-
tors. It is assumed that a patient depositor always chooses L if she is indifferent
between choosing E and L. The only pure strategy Nash equilibrium is that
both depositors play (L,E), which constitutes a non-run equilibrium. A patient
depositor withdraws late regardless of the action of the other depositor.
If T2 < T1 and T4 ≥ T3, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, either
both depositors play (E,E) which gives a run equilibrium or both play (L,E)
which gives a non-run equilibrium. The two depositors’ actions exhibit strategic
complementarity where a patient depositor withdraws early if and only if the
other depositor also withdraws early.
If T3 > T4, the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium is that both depositors
play (E,E). The depositors would not have deposited in the bank because the
ex-ante expected utility from autarky is higher. It is possible to have T2 ≥ T1
and T3 > T4. Then, the two pure strategy equilibria are (L,E), (E,E) and
(E,E), (L,E). The parameter values are assumed to satisfy (1.1) such that this
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case never happen since T3 > T4 implies T1 > T2.
A.2 Parameter Restriction 1
Lemma 14. There exists τ¯ such that dW˜ (c˜,B˜;s)
ds
< 0 for s ∈ (0, 1) and τ ≤ τ¯ .
Notice that Ŵ (c, B) = W˜ (c, B; 0). In order for the best panic-based run-proof
allocation to always dominate the best panic-based run-permitting allocation, it
is sufficient to ensure that W˜ (c˜, B˜; s) is strictly decreasing in s. This happens
when the tax rate is low, τ ≤ τ¯ .
Higher run probability s could potentially increase the best panic-based run-
permitting welfare if tax is high, τ > τ¯ . When τ > τ¯ , it is more desirable to trans-
fer resources from public good provision to private consumption. The only way
the planner could do that is through bailouts. However, bailout payments are
only made when both depositors withdraw in period 1. When s is high, the
probability of having two depositors withdrawing in period 1 is high; the prob-
ability of the ability to transfer resources from public good provision to private
consumption is also high. Therefore, the best panic-based run-permitting allo-
cation could dominate the best panic-based run-proof allocation.1
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Figure A.1: Unconstrained Efficient Contract
A.3 Constrained Efficient Allocation Numerical Examples
The following parameter values are used for the numerical examples:
R = 1.5 γ = 1.01 D = 1 y = 3 p = 0.5 τ = 0.5 (A.2)
According to Lemma 17, the value of A determines which of the three cases
the economy is in. Figure A.1 shows the plot of ĉ together with c¯early(B̂) and
c¯wait(B̂). It can be seen from the diagram the range of values of A that cor-
responds to each of the three cases. Based on the parameter values in (A.2),
Aearly = 1.49808 and Await = 1.76375.
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Figure A.2: Constrained Efficient Outcome (Case 2)
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A.3.1 Case 1: A ≤ Aearly
Set A = 1.4 ≤ 1.49808 = Aearly. The unconstrained efficient allocation is always
implementable in the constrained efficient economy. The constrained efficient
allocation and welfare is given by
c∗ = 1.75097 B∗ = 0.50421 W ∗ = −436.40663 (A.3)
and are independent of s.
A.3.2 Case 2: Aearly < A ≤ Await
Set A = 1.65 ∈ (Aearly, Await]. Figure A.2 shows the constrained efficient de-
posit contract and bailout policy. The run probability at which the constrained
efficient allocation jumps from panic-based run-permitting to panic-based run-
proof is s0 = 0.0060746.
The constrained efficient welfare function is the envelope of two functions:
the best panic-based run-proof welfare Ŵ (cearly, Bearly), which is constant in s,
and the best panic-based run-permitting welfare W˜ (c˜, B˜; s), which is strictly de-
creasing in s. Welfare is continuous at s0 but the optimal contract and bailout
are discontinuous. In order for the planner to switch from panic-based run-
permitting to panic-based run-proof at s0, both the contract and the bailout have
to be significantly lower to satisfy the DSIC constraint (c ≤ cearly(B)).
1It would be interesting to explore the problem when τ > τ¯ . However, the focus is on the
more intuitive case where higher run probability always gives a lower welfare under the best
panic-based run-permitting allocation.
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Figure A.3: Constrained Efficient Outcome (Case 3)
A.3.3 Case 3: A > Await
Two examples are presented for Case 3: One with s2 < s1 where ICC is only
binding for a fraction of the measure of s at which the constrained efficient al-
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location is panic-based run-permitting, and another with s1 = s2 where ICC is
binding for the entire measure.
When A = 1.77, the cutoff probabilities are s2 = 0.011386 and s1 = 0.018069.
The plots of the constrained efficient allocation and welfare against s are shown
in Figure A.3. The red dashed lines show the allocation in the hypothetical case
in which there is no ICC. For s < s1, the constrained efficient allocation is panic-
based run-permitting. For a subset of this measure, s ≤ s2, the ICC is binding.
The planner could have achieved a higher welfare by choosing higher c and B,
as shown by the dashed lines. However, the planner has to adjust to lower c
and B so that the ICC is satisfied.
When A = 2, the cutoff probabilities are s1 = s2 = 0.046827. The ICC
binds for the entire measure of s in which the constrained efficient allocation
is panic-based run-permitting. Figure A.4 shows the constrained efficient al-
location when A = 2. Again, the red dashed lines represent the constrained
efficient allocation if there was no ICC. For s < s1 = s2 = 0.046827, the con-
strained efficient allocation is panic-based run-permitting and the ICC is bind-
ing. Similarly, the planner could have achieved a higher welfare by increasing c
and B to the levels shown by the dashed lines if there was no ICC. Notice that
the constrained efficient allocation switches from panic-based run-permitting to
panic-based run-proof at a higher cutoff probability in the case when there was
no ICC. This is because the best panic-based run-permitting welfare is strictly
higher when there was no ICC. Thus, the intersection between the best panic-
based run-permitting welfare and the best panic-based run-proof welfare also
occurs at a higher s.
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A.4 Fiscal Authority with Commitment Numerical Examples
A.4.1 Case 1: A ≤ Aearly
The same parameter values from (1.8) are used here. The allocation under the
fiscal authority with commitment is identical to the constrained efficient alloca-
tion in (A.3) and is independent of s.
c∗1 = 1.75097 B
∗
1 = 0.50421 W
∗
1 = −436.40663
A.4.2 Case 3: A > Await
The numerical example for Case 2 is shown in Section 1.4.1. The plots of the
equilibrium allocation in Case 3 are qualitatively identical to those in Case 2.
Figure A.5 shows the equilibrium allocation and welfare under the fiscal author-
ity with commitment and constrained efficient economy when A = 2. The same
argument from Case 2 in Section 1.4.1 explains the wedge in welfare between
the constrained efficient economy and the economy under the fiscal authority
with commitment.
A.5 Fiscal Authority without Commitment Equilibrium Char-
acterization
Proposition 15. If p ≤
√
γ−1
γ
Kgood, there exists a threshold A¯sep such that (1) when
A ≤ A¯sep, the equilibrium contract under the fiscal authority without commitment
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gives the “good” pooling equilibrium in the post-deposit game for s ∈ [0, 1] and (2)
when A > A¯sep, the equilibrium contract gives the separating equilibrium in the post-
deposit game if s ∈ [0, s3) and the “good” pooling equilibrium if s ∈ [s3, 1] for some
s3 ∈ (0, 1].
When the impulse demand is low (A ≤ A¯sep), the bank does not have the in-
tention to offer high c to channel more resources to the early withdrawals. The
bank chooses c that is sufficiently low such that the “good” pooling equilibrium
exists in the post-deposit game. When the impulse demand is high (A > A¯sep),
the bank has high incentive to increase c to channel more resources to the early
withdrawals. When s is low (s < s3), the cost of allowing the separating equi-
librium in the post-deposit game is low. The bank chooses a high c and tolerates
the separating equilibrium in the post-deposit game. As s increases (s ≥ s3),
the cost of tolerating for the separating equilibrium in the post-deposit game
increases and outweighs the benefit of choosing a high c. Therefore, the bank
chooses a lower c such that there is the “good” pooling equilibrium in the post-
deposit game.
A.6 Parameter Restriction 2
The first restriction is
p ≤
√
γ − 1
γ
Kgood
such that the result from Proposition 15 holds. Next, there exists τ¯1 such that
d
ds
(
max
c∈R+
W˜pri(c, B
∗
sep(c))
)
< 0
81
as long as τ ≤ τ¯ . The proof is similar to Lemma 14. To make sure that
c∗2 /∈ (cgood, csep], the only restriction is on A since ĉ2 is strictly increasing in
A as shown in the Proof of Proposition 15. There exists Agood such that when
A ≤ Agood, the bank’s optimal contract is c∗2 ∈ (0, cgood] which gives the “good”
pooling equilibrium in the post-deposit game for s ∈ [0, 1]. When A > A¯sep,
c∗2 ∈ (c¯sep, 2(1 − τ)y) for s ∈ [0, s3). These are the only combinations of A and s
that are considered in the analysis.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 1
The inequality T2 ≥ T1 can be written as
((2(1− τ)y − c)R)1−γ
1− γ −
1
2
[
c1−γ
1− γ +
(2(1− τ)y − c+B)1−γ
1− γ
]
≥ 0 (A.4)
The derivative of the LHS of (A.4) is
∂LHS
∂c
= −(2(1− τ)y − c)−γR1−γ − 1
2
c−γ +
1
2
(2(1− τ)y − c+B)−γ
< −(2(1− τ)y − c)−γR1−γ − 1
2
c−γ +
1
2
(2(1− τ)y − c)−γ
= (2(1− τ)y − c)−γ
(
1
2
−R1−γ
)
− 1
2
c−γ
A sufficient condition for the derivative to be negative is that 1/2 − R1−γ < 0,
which is equivalent to γ < 1 + ln 2/ lnR. The LHS of (A.4) is continuous in c for
c ∈ (0, 2(1 − τ)y). Also, the limit of LHS of (A.4) is +∞ when c → 0 and −∞
when c→ 2(1− τ)y. Therefore, there exists a unique cearly ∈ (0, 2(1− τ)y) such
that T1 = T2. Also, T2 ≥ T1 as long as c ∈ [0, cearly].
82
A.8 Proof of Lemma 2
The inequality T4 ≥ T3 can be written as
(1− p)
[
((1− τ)yR)1−γ
1− γ −
c1−γ
1− γ
]
+ p
[
((2(1− τ)y − c)R)1−γ
1− γ −
1
2
( c1−γ
1− γ +
(2(1− τ)y − c+B)1−γ
1− γ
)]
≥ 0
(A.5)
The limit of LHS of (A.5) is +∞ when c → 0 and −∞ when c → 2(y − τ). The
LHS is continuous in c for c ∈ (0, 2(y − τ)). Also,
∂LHS
∂c
= −(1− p
2
)c−γ − p(2(1− τ)y − c)−γR1−γ + p
2
(2(1− τ)y − c+B)−γ
< −(1− p
2
)c−γ − p(2(1− τ)y − c)−γR1−γ + p
2
(2(1− τ)y − c)−γ
= −(1− p
2
)c−γ + p(2(1− τ)y − c)−γ
(
1
2
−R1−γ
)
< 0
as long as γ < 1 + ln 2/ lnR.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 3
First, find a sufficient condition for cearly(0) < cwait(0). When B = 0,
cearly(0) =
2(y − τ)
( 2
Rγ−1 − 1)1/(γ−1) + 1
In order for cearly(0) < cwait(0), it should be true that T4 > T3 when c = cearly(0).
This condition can be simplified to
2/R
( 2
Rγ−1 − 1)1/(γ−1) + 1
< 1 (A.6)
When γ < 1+ln 2/ lnR, ( 2
Rγ−1 −1)1/(γ−1) is decreasing in γ. Therefore, inequality
(A.6) can be further simplified to
γ < 2
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Therefore, as long as
γ < min{2, 1 + ln 2/ lnR} (A.7)
the inequality cearly(0) < cwait(0) always holds.
Suppose there exists B ∈ (0, 2τy] such that cwait(B) ≤ cearly(B). Since cearly(B)
and cwait(B) are continuous functions of B, and cearly(0) < cwait(0), there exists
B¯ ∈ (0, 2τy] such that
cwait(B¯) = cearly(B¯) ≡ c¯
and
∂cwait(B¯)
∂B
≤ ∂c
early(B¯)
∂B
(A.8)
The derivatives on both sides of the inequality on (A.8) can be obtained by tak-
ing implicit derivatives of equations T1 = T2 and T3 = T4. The derivatives
evaluated at c¯ and B¯ are given by
∂cearly(B¯)
∂B
= −
1
2
(2(1− τ)y − c¯+ B¯)−γ
1
2
c¯−γ + (2(1− τ)y − c¯)−γR1−γ − 1
2
(2(1− τ)y − c¯+ B¯)−γ
∂cwait(B¯)
∂B
= −
p
2
(2(1− τ)y − c¯+ B¯)−γ
(1− p
2
)c¯−γ + p(2(1− τ)y − c¯)−γR1−γ − p
2
(2(1− τ)y − c¯+ B¯)−γ
Inequality (A.8) evaluated at c¯ and B¯ can be simplified to
0 ≥ c¯−γ
which is a contradiction. Therefore, cearly(B) < cwait(B) holds for anyB ∈ [0, 2τ ]
as long as (A.7) holds.
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A.10 Proof of Lemma 4
(ĉ, B̂) solves the following first-order conditions:
p2
[
Aĉ−γ − A(2(1− τ)y − ĉ+ B̂)−γ]
+2p(1− p)[Aĉ−γ −R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − ĉ)−γ] = 0
p2
[
A(2(1− τ)y − ĉ+ B̂)−γ − 2D(2τy − B̂)−γ] = 0
Simplifying yields:
B̂ = 2τy − (
2D
A
)1/γ
1 + (2D
A
)1/γ
(2y − ĉ) ≡ 2τy −K1(2y − ĉ)
(p2A+ 2p(1− p)A)ĉ−γ =p2A((1−K1)(2y − ĉ))−γ
+ 2p(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − ĉ)−γ (A.9)
Taking the derivative of (A.9) with respect to A gives:
dĉ
dA
=
(p2 + 2p(1− p))ĉ−γ − p2((1−K1)(2y − ĉ))−γ
γ(p2A+ 2p(1− p)A)ĉ−γ−1 + p2A(1−K1)−γ(2y − ĉ)−γ−1
+ 2p(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − ĉ)−γ−1
> 0
cearly(B̂) solves the following equation:
((2(1− τ)y − cearly(B̂))R)1−γ
1− γ =
1
2
[
cearly(B̂)1−γ
1− γ +
(1−K1)(2y − cearly(B̂)))1−γ
1− γ
]
Taking the derivative with respect to A gives:
dcearly(B̂)
dA
=
1
2
(1−K1)−γ(2y − cearly(B̂))1−γ dK1dA
1
2
cearly(B̂)−γ +R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − cearly(B̂))−γ
− 1
2
(1−K1)1−γ(2y − cearly(B̂))−γ
Since
∂K1
∂A
=
− 1
γ
(2D)1/γ
A1/γ+1
(1 +
(
2D
A
)1/γ
) + 1
γ
(2D)1/γ
A1/γ+1
(2D
A
)1/γ
(1 +
(
2D
A
)1/γ
)2
=
− 1
γ
(2D)1/γ
A1/γ+1
(1 +
(
2D
A
)1/γ
)2
< 0
85
it is true that
dcearly(B̂)
dA
< 0
cwait(B̂) solves the following equation:
(1− p)((1− τ)yR)
1−γ
1− γ + p
((2(1− τ)y − cwait(B̂))R)1−γ
1− γ
=(1− p)c
wait(B̂)1−γ
1− γ +
p
2
[
cwait(B̂)1−γ
1− γ +
((1−K1)(2y − cwait(B̂)))1−γ
1− γ
]
Taking the derivative with respect to A gives:
dcwait(B̂)
dA
=
p
2
(1−K1)−γ(2y − cwait(B̂))1−γ dK1dA
(1− p
2
)cwait(B̂)−γ + pR1−γ(2(1− τ)y − cwait(B̂))−γ
− p
2
(1−K1)1−γ(2y − cwait(B̂))−γ
< 0
Since ĉ is strictly increasing inA and cearly(B̂) and cwait(B̂) are strictly decreasing
in A, there exist cutoffs Aearly and Await. Also, since cwait(B̂) > cearly(B̂) it is also
true that Await > Aearly.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 5
Case 2 is when the unconstrained efficient allocation (ĉ, B̂) is BIC but not DSIC.
It is trivial that (c˜, B˜) = (ĉ, B̂) ∈ Swait\Searly when s = 0. Therefore, the con-
strained efficient allocation is
(c∗, B∗) = (c˜, B˜)
for s = 0. The run-permitting welfare level evaluated at (c˜, B˜) can be written as
W˜ (c˜, B˜) = (1− s)Ŵ (c˜, B˜) + sW run(c˜, B˜)
Since tax is assumed to satisfy τ ≤ τ¯ , it is true that
W˜ (c˜, B˜)
ds
< 0
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for s ∈ (0, 1). It is also easily verified that W˜ (c˜, B˜) is continuous in s for s ∈ [0, 1].
Notice that when s = 1, the panic-based run-permitting welfare is W˜ (τ˜ , c˜, B˜) =
W run(τ˜ , c˜, B˜). If W run(τ˜ , c˜, B˜) < Ŵ (τ early, cearly, Bearly), there exists sw ∈ (0, 1)
such that
W˜ (τ˜ , c˜, B˜) = (1− sw)Ŵ (τ˜ , c˜, B˜) + swW run(τ˜ , c˜, B˜) = Ŵ (τ early, cearly, Bearly)
(A.10)
Since W˜ (c˜, B˜) is continuous and strictly decreasing, the following relations hold:
W˜ (c˜, B˜) > Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) if s < sw
W˜ (c˜, B˜) < Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) if s > sw
W˜ (c˜, B˜) = Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) if s = sw
Next is to check if (c˜, B˜) is implementable. Since dc˜
ds
< 0 for s ∈ (0, 1), all is left
to prove is that dc
wait(B˜)
ds
> 0 and dc
early(B˜)
ds
> 0. Then, there exists sc ∈ (0, 1] such
that c˜ > cearly(B˜) for s < sc and c˜ ≤ cwait(B˜) for all s ∈ [0, 1].
Pick s0 = min{sw, sc}. Then, when s < s0, the constrained efficient allocation is
panic-based run-permitting (c∗, B∗) = (c˜, B˜) and when s ≥ s0, the constrained
efficient allocation is panic-based run-proof (c∗, B∗) = (cearly, Bearly). 2
If W run(τ˜ , c˜, B˜) ≥ Ŵ (τ early, cearly, Bearly), there does not exists s0 ∈ (0, 1) such
that (A.10) holds. Therefore, s0 = 1.
Next is to prove that dc
wait(B˜)
ds
> 0 and dc
early(B˜)
ds
> 0. Taking the derivative of
2Notice that even though when s = s0 the best panic-based run-permitting allocation (c˜, B˜)
and the best panic-based run-proof allocation (τearly, cearly, Bearly) give the same level of wel-
fare, it is assumed that the panic-based run-proof option is chosen.
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B˜ with respect to s:
dB˜
ds
= −dK2
ds
(2y − c˜) +K2 dc˜
ds
(A.11)
where
K2 =
K1
1 +K1
K1 =
[ [
(1− s)p2 + s]2D
(1− s)p2A+ s[p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2]
]1/γ
Taking the derivative of K1 with respect to s:
dK1
ds
=
1
γ
[ [
(1− s)p2 + s]2D[
(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]3
]1/γ−1
×
[
2D(1− p2)[(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]
− 2Ds[p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2][(1− s)p2 + s]]
sign
{
dK1
ds
}
= sign
{
(1− p2)[p2A+ s(p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]
− [p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2][(1− s)p2 + s]}
= sign
{
(1− p2)p2A
+
(
p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)[(1− p2)s− (1− s)p2 − s]}
= sign
{
(2p(1− p) + (1− p)2)p2A− p2(p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)}
= sign
{
2p(1− p)A+ (1− p)2A− p(1− p)(A+ 1)− (1− p)2
}
= sign
{
p(1− p)(A− 1) + (1− p)2(A− 1)
}
> 0
Therefore, it is also true that
dK2
ds
> 0
cearly(B˜) solves the following equation:
((2(1− τ)y − cearly(B˜))R)1−γ
1− γ =
1
2
[
cearly(B˜)1−γ
1− γ +
(2(1− τ)y − cearly(B˜) + B˜)1−γ
1− γ
]
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Taking the derivative with respect to s gives:
dcearly(B˜)
ds
= − (2(1− τ)y − c
early(B˜) + B˜)−γ dB˜
ds
1
2
cearly(B˜)−γ − 1
2
(2(1− τ)y − cearly(B˜) + B˜)−γ
+R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − cearly(B˜))−γ
cwait(B˜) solves the following equation:
(1− p)((1− τ)yR)
1−γ
1− γ + p
((2(1− τ)y − cwait(B˜))R)1−γ
1− γ
=(1− p)c
wait(B˜)1−γ
1− γ +
p
2
[
cwait(B˜)1−γ
1− γ +
(2(1− τ)y − cwait(B˜) + B˜)1−γ
1− γ
]
Taking the derivative with respect to s gives:
dcwait(B˜)
ds
= −
p
2
(2(1− τ)y − cwait(B˜) + B˜)−γ dB˜
ds
(1− p
2
)cwait(B˜)−γ − p
2
(2(1− τ)y − cwait(B˜) + B˜)−γ
+ pR1−γ(2(y − τ)− cwait(B˜))−γ
Since dc˜
ds
< 0, it is also true that dB˜
ds
< 0, dc
early(B˜)
ds
> 0 and dc
wait(B˜)
ds
> 0.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 6
In Case 3, the unconstrained efficient allocation (ĉ, B̂) is neither DSIC nor BIC.
This means that the best panic-based run-permitting allocation when s = 0 is
(cwait, Bwait) instead of (c˜, B˜).
Define s¯3 ∈ (0, 1] such that W˜ (c˜, B˜) ≤ Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) for s ∈ [s¯3, 1] and
W˜ (c˜, B˜) > Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) for s ∈ [0, s¯3).
It can be shown in a similar fashion as in Lemma 14 that W˜ (cwait, Bwait) is strictly
decreasing in s for s ∈ (0, 1). Define s¯2 ∈ [0, 1] such that W˜ (cwait, Bwait) ≤
Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) for s ∈ [s¯2, 1] and W˜ (cwait, Bwait) > Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) for s ∈
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[0, s¯2).
Define s¯1 ∈ (0, 1] such that the best run-permitting allocation is (cwait, Bwait)
if s ∈ [0, s¯1] and (c˜, B˜) if s ∈ (s¯1, 1].
If s¯2 > s¯1, pick
s1 = min{s¯3, 1}
s2 = min{s¯1, 1}
If s¯2 ≤ s¯1, pick
s1 = s2 = min{s¯2, 1}
A.13 Proof of Proposition 7
Let (c∗1, B∗1) be the equilibrium allocation under the fiscal authority with com-
mitment and (c∗, B∗) the constrained efficient allocation. The welfare achieved
by (c∗, B∗) is always as least as high as the welfare achieved by (c∗1, B∗1), it is
sufficient to show that the response of the banks given B∗ is the similar to the
constrained efficient contract, c∗1(B∗) = c∗ to ensure that the economy under the
fiscal authority with commitment is constrained efficient. This is shown sepa-
rately for the three cases.
Define the following response functions:
ĉ1(B) ≡ arg max
c
Ŵ (c, B) (A.12)
c˜1(B) ≡ arg max
c
W˜ (c, B) (A.13)
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Under the fiscal authority with commitment, for any given by B set by the fis-
cal authority, ĉ1(B) is the unconstrained efficient contract and c˜1(B) is the best
panic-based run-permitting contract from the bank’s perspective.
Case 1:
This is the case in which the unconstrained efficient allocation is DSIC.
(c∗, B∗) = (ĉ, B̂)
where (ĉ, B̂) satisfies the first-order conditions:
∂Ŵ
∂c
=
∂Ŵ
∂B
= 0
It is straightforward to see that the solution to the bank’s problem in (A.12) is
ĉ1(τ̂ , B̂) = ĉ because
∂Ŵpri
∂c
=
∂Ŵ
∂c
= 0
which is also the first-order condition for the bank’s problem. Also,
(ĉ1(B̂), B̂) = (ĉ, B̂) ∈ Searly
which means that the unconstrained efficient contract is implementable, so
c∗1(B̂) = ĉ1(B̂) = ĉ = c
∗.
Case 2:
This is the case in which the unconstrained efficient allocation is BIC but not
DSIC. Proposition 5 states that there exists s0 ∈ (0, 1] such that (Case 2.1) for any
s < s0, (c∗, B∗) = (c˜, B˜) and (Case 2.2) for any s ≥ s0, (c∗, B∗) = (cearly, Bearly).
Case 2.1: s < s0
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Suppose the fiscal authority chooses B˜. If c∗1(B˜) = c˜1(B˜), then it is true that
c∗1(B˜) = c˜1(B˜) = c˜ since
∂W˜pri
∂c
=
∂W˜
∂c
Suppose, by contradiction, that c∗1(B˜) 6= c˜1(B˜). Then either c∗1(B˜) = ĉ1(B˜) or
c∗1(B˜) = c
early(B˜). 3
If c∗1(B˜) = ĉ1(B˜), then (ĉ1(B˜), B˜) ∈ Searly. It also has to be true that
Ŵpri(ĉ1(B˜), B˜) ≥ W˜pri(c˜1(B˜), B˜)
which implies that
Ŵ (ĉ1(B˜), B˜)− 2p2Γ(2τy − B˜)− 2(1− p2)Γ(2τy)
≥ W˜ (c˜, B˜)− 2p2Γ(2τy − B˜)− 2(1− p)2[sΓ(2τy − B˜) + (1− s)Γ(2τy)]
Since B˜ > 0, it is true that
Ŵ (ĉ1(B˜), B˜) > W˜ (c˜, B˜)
This means that (c˜, B˜) is not the constrained efficient allocation, which is a con-
tradiction.
If c∗1(B˜) = cearly(B˜), it has to be true that
Ŵpri(c
early(B˜), B˜) ≥ W˜pri(c˜1(B˜), B˜)
which implies that
Ŵ (cearly(B˜), B˜)− p2Γ(2τy − B˜)− (1− p2)Γ(2τy)
≥ W˜ (c˜, B˜)− p2Γ(2τy − B˜)− (1− p)2[sΓ(2τy − B˜) + (1− s)Γ(2τy)]
3It is not necessary to consider the possibility that c∗1(B˜) = cwait(B˜) because (c˜, B˜) ∈ Swait.
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or
Ŵ (cearly(B˜), B˜) > W˜ (c˜, B˜) (A.14)
This also means that (c˜, B˜) is not the constrained efficient allocation, which is a
contradiction. In the case where (A.14) holds in equality, it is assumed that the
panic-based run-proof allocation is chosen, which also means that (c˜, B˜) would
not be chosen.
Case 2.2: s ≥ s0
Suppose the fiscal authority chooses Bearly. It is straightforward to see that
c∗1(B
early) 6= ĉ1(Bearly). Otherwise (cearly, Bearly) would not have been the con-
strained efficient allocation.
Since (cearly, Bearly) is the constrained efficient allocation:
Ŵ (cearly, Bearly) ≥ W˜ (c˜, B˜) ≥ W˜ (c˜1(Bearly), Bearly)
which implies that
Ŵpri(c
early, Bearly) + p2Γ(2τy −Bearly) + (1− p2)Γ(2τy)
> W˜pri(c˜1(B
early), Bearly) + p2Γ(2τy −Bearly)
+ (1− p2)[sΓ(2τy −Bearly) + (1− s)Γ(2τy)]
or
W˜pri(c˜1(B
early), Bearly)− Ŵpri(cearly, Bearly)
< s(1− p2)[Γ(2τy)− Γ(2τy −Bearly)]
Notice that the RHS of the inequality is strictly positive. When s = s0, exactly
one of the two following conditions has to be true:
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(i) W˜pri(c˜1(Bearly), Bearly) ≤ Ŵpri(cearly, Bearly)
(ii) W˜pri(c˜1(Bearly), Bearly) > Ŵpri(cearly, Bearly)
Using the fact that W˜pri(c˜1(Bearly), Bearly) is a strictly decreasing function of s,
the constrained efficient allocation is implementable under the fiscal authority
with commitment for any s ≥ s0 if condition (i) is true. If condition (ii) is true,
there exists ε0 > 0 such that the constrained efficient allocation is not imple-
mentable under the fiscal authority with commitment for s0 ≤ s < s0 + ε0 but it
is implementable for s ≥ s0 + ε0.
At s = s0 and when condition (ii) is true, even though the constrained ef-
ficient allocation (cearly, Bearly) is not implementable, the constrained efficient
welfare level can still be achieved since (c˜, B˜) is implementable and gives the
same welfare level as (cearly, Bearly). Therefore, the economy under the fiscal au-
thority with commitment is not constrained efficient only when s ∈ (s0, s0 + ε0).
Case 3:
This is the case in which the unconstrained efficient allocation is neither BIC
nor DSIC. According to Proposition 6, there exist s1 ∈ (0, 1] and s2 ∈ (0, s1] such
that the constrained efficient allocation is (cwait, Bwait) when s < s2, (c˜, B˜) when
s2 ≤ s < s1 and (cearly, Bearly) when s ≥ s1.
The proof for when s2 ≤ s < s1 is similar to Case 2.1 and s ≥ s1 to Case 2.2. It
is left to show that when s < s2, the constrained efficient allocation (cwait, Bwait)
is implementable.
Suppose the fiscal authority chooses Bwait when s < s2. The bank’s best
response contract has to be one of the four: ĉ1(Bwait), cearly(Bwait), c˜(Bwait) or
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cwait(τwait, Bwait).
If c∗1(Bwait) = ĉ1(Bwait), then it has to be true that
(ĉ1(B
wait), Bwait) ∈ Searly
and
Ŵpri(ĉ1(B
wait), Bwait) ≥ W˜pri(cwait(Bwait), Bwait)
which implies that
Ŵ (ĉ1(B
wait), Bwait)− p2Γ(2τy −Bwait)− (1− p2)Γ(2τy)
≥ W˜pri(cwait, Bwait)− p2Γ(2τy −Bearly)
− (1− p2)[sΓ(2τy −Bearly) + (1− s)Γ(2τy)]
or
Ŵ (ĉ1(B
wait), Bwait) ≥ W˜pri(cwait, Bwait)
which is a contradiction because (cwait, Bwait) is the constrained efficient alloca-
tion. c∗1(Bwait) = cearly(Bwait) can be eliminated using the same method.
If c∗1(Bwait) = c˜1(Bwait), then it has to be true that
(c˜1(B
wait), Bwait) ∈ Swait
and
W˜pri(c˜1(B
wait), Bwait) ≥ W˜pri(cwait(Bwait), Bwait)
which implies that
W˜ (c˜1(B
wait), Bwait) ≥ W˜ (cwait, Bwait)
which is a contradiction since (cwait, Bwait) is the constrained efficient allocation.
Therefore, the only possibility is that c∗1(Bwait) = cwait(Bwait) = cwait.
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A.14 Proof of Lemma 8 and 9
The responses from (1.10) and (1.12) can be written in the following form:
B∗i = 2τy −Ki(2y − c)
where Ki ∈ (0, 1) is a constant defined accordingly. The inequality from T2 ≥ T1
becomes
((2(1− τ)y − c)R)1−γ
1− γ −
1
2
[
c1−γ
1− γ +
((2−Ki)(2y − c))1−γ
1− γ
]
≥ 0 (A.15)
The LHS of (A.15) is a continuous function of c on c ∈ [0, 2(1− τ)y]. The LHS is
+∞when c = 0 and −∞when c = 2(1− τ)y. Again, the remaining proof is just
to show that the LHS is strictly decreasing in c.
∂LHS
∂c
= −(2(1− τ)y − c)−γR1−γ − 1
2
c−γ +
1
2
(2y − c)−γ(2−Ki)1−γ
< −(2y − c)−γR1−γ − 1
2
c−γ +
1
2
(2y − c)−γ(2−Ki)1−γ
= (2y − c)−γ
(
1
2
(2−Ki)1−γ −R1−γ
)
− 1
2
c−γ
A sufficient condition for the derivative to be negative is that
1
2
(2−Ki)1−γ −R1−γ < 1
2
−R1−γ < 0
which is equivalent to γ < 1 + ln 2/ lnR. The proof for when B∗i = 0 is trivial
and included in Lemma 12.
The inequality T4 ≥ T3 can be written as
(1− p)
[
((1− τ)yR)1−γ
1− γ −
c1−γ
1− γ
]
+ p
[
((2(1− τ)y − c)R)1−γ
1− γ −
1
2
( c1−γ
1− γ +
((2−Ki)(2y − c))1−γ
1− γ
)]
≥ 0
(A.16)
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The LHS of (A.16) is a continuous function of c on c ∈ [0, 2(1− τ)y]. The LHS is
again +∞when c = 0 and −∞when c = 2(1− τ)y. The derivative of the LHS
∂LHS
∂c
= −(1− p
2
)c−γ − p(2(1− τ)y − c)−γR1−γ + p
2
(2y − c)−γ(2−Ki)1−γ
< −(1− p
2
)c−γ − p(2y − c)−γR1−γ + p
2
(2y − c)−γ(2−Ki)1−γ
= −(1− p
2
)c−γ + p(2y − c)−γ
(
1
2
(2−Ki)1−γ −R1−γ
)
< 0
as long as γ < 1+ln 2/ lnR. The proof for whenB∗i = 0 is trivial and included in
Lemma 13. It follows from Lemma 16 that csep < c¯sep. The proof of the existence
of the “good” and “bad” pooling equilibria for c ≤ csep and c > c¯sep respectively
can be done in a similar fashion.
A.15 Proof of Proposition 10
It is sufficient to show that the constrained efficient allocation is not imple-
mentable in the economy under the fiscal authority without commitment. The
constrained efficient allocation has to be one of the following:
(i) (ĉ, B̂)
(ii) (c˜, B˜)
(iii) (cearly, Bearly)
(iv) (cwait, Bwait)
(ĉ, B̂) satisfies the following first-order condition
∂Ŵ (ĉ, B̂)
∂c
=
∂Ŵ (ĉ, B̂)
∂B
= 0
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which implies that
∂Ŵpri(ĉ, B̂)
∂c
= 0
The first-order derivative of the bank’s objective function is
∂Ŵpri(ĉ, B̂)
∂c
+
∂Ŵpri(ĉ, B̂)
∂B
Kproof
=p2(2(1− τ)y − c+B)−γKproof > 0
which means that (ĉ, B̂) is not implementable. It can be shown in similar way
that (c˜, B˜) is not implementable as well.
(cearly, Bearly) has to satisfy the following
cearly = c¯early(Bearly)
∂Ŵ (cearly, Bearly)
∂c
∂c¯early(Bearly)
∂B
+
∂Ŵ (cearly, Bearly)
∂B
= 0 (A.17)
Suppose the bank chooses cearly. It is sufficient to show that Bearly is not the best
response of the fiscal authority. From (A.17), one has
∂Ŵ (cearly, Bearly)
∂B
= −∂Ŵ (c
early, Bearly)
∂c
∂c¯early(Bearly)
∂B
6= 0
This means that Bearly does not satisfy the first-order condition of the fiscal au-
thority’s problem given that the bank chose cearly. Therefore, (cearly, Bearly) is not
implementable. It can be shown in similar manner that (cwait, Bwait) is also not
implementable.
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A.16 Proof of Proposition 11
A.16.1 The Fiscal Authority with Commitment
From Proposition 7, the constrained efficient allocation is always (cearly, Bearly)
when the economy is not constrained efficient. This implies that if the fis-
cal authority chooses Bearly, the bank’s response is not c¯early(Bearly) = cearly.
The bank’s response c∗1 has to be one of the following: ĉ1(Bearly), c˜1(Bearly) or
c¯wait(Bearly).
Suppose c∗1 = ĉ1(Bearly). Then ĉ1(Bearly) < c¯early(Bearly), and
(ĉ1(B
early), Bearly) ∈ Searly. Also, it has to be true that
Ŵpri(ĉ1(B
early), Bearly) > Ŵpri(c¯
early(Bearly), Bearly)
Adding the utilities from public good provision on both sides of the inequality
gives
Ŵ (ĉ1(B
early), Bearly) > Ŵ (c¯early(Bearly), Bearly)
Ŵ (ĉ1(B
early), Bearly) > Ŵ (cearly, Bearly)
This implies that (cearly, Bearly) is not the constrained efficient allocation, which
is a contradiction. Therefore, the bank’s optimal contract is either c∗1 = c˜1(Bearly)
or c∗1 = c¯wait(Bearly). In both cases, c∗1 > cearly. If the fiscal authority sets c¯ = cearly,
the upper bound is strictly binding in the measure of s and the optimal contract
of the bank is cearly. The economy is constrained efficient.
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A.16.2 The Fiscal Authority without Commitment
Suppose A¯sep > Aearly. Consider A ∈ (Aearly, A¯sep]. Then both ĉ > c¯early(B̂) and
ĉ2 ≤ csep hold. It is shown next that ĉ2 > ĉ. When s = 0, c∗2 = ĉ2 ∈ (cearly, csep],
which violates the parameter restrictions stated in Section A.6 of the Appendix.
Therefore, it has to be true that A¯sep ≤ Aearly.
Case 1: A ≤ A¯sep
The constrained efficient allocation is (c∗, B∗) = (ĉ, B̂) and the equilibrium allo-
cation is (ĉ2, B∗good(ĉ2). Define the following function
Ωpri(c) ≡ Ŵ (c, B∗good(c))
Ω is strictly concave since it is the composite of a strictly concave function Ŵpri
and a weakly concave function B∗good. The equilibrium is never constrained ef-
ficient (from Proposition 10), which implies that (ĉ, B̂) 6= (ĉ2, B∗good(ĉ2)). Since
B∗good(c) is a strictly increasing function of c, either (ĉ, B̂)  (ĉ2, B∗good(ĉ2)) or
(ĉ, B̂) (ĉ2, B∗good(ĉ2)).
Suppose (ĉ, B̂)  (ĉ2, B∗good(ĉ2)). (ĉ2, B∗good(ĉ2)) has to satisfy the first-order
condition of the bank’s problem:
∂Ωpri(ĉ2)
∂c
= 0 (A.18)
Since Ωpri is strictly concave and ĉ > ĉ2,
∂Ωpri(ĉ)
∂c
<
∂Ωpri(ĉ2)
∂c
= 0
By a simple comparison of the first-order conditions, it can be shown that B̂ =
B∗good(ĉ). Thus,
∂Ωpri(ĉ)
∂c
=
∂Ŵpri(ĉ, B
∗
good(ĉ))
∂c
+
∂Ŵpri(ĉ, B
∗
good(ĉ))
∂B
Kgood < 0
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and
∂Ŵpri(ĉ, B̂)
∂c
< −∂Ŵpri(ĉ, B̂)
∂B
Kgood < 0
This means that
∂Ŵ (ĉ, B̂)
∂c
=
∂Ŵpri(ĉ, B̂)
∂c
< 0
and (ĉ, B̂) does not satisfy the first-order condition, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, (ĉ, B̂)  (ĉ2, B∗good(ĉ2)). If the fiscal authority set the upper bound at
c¯ = ĉ, the upper bound is binding and the bank responds with ĉ, which makes
the economy constrained efficient. This is true for s ∈ [0, 1].
Case 2: A¯sep < A ≤ Aearly
In this case, ĉ2 is not implementable, or ĉ2 > csep. Also, the constrained efficient
allocation is (ĉ, B̂), so ĉ ≤ cearly. For s ∈ [0, 1], it is true that
ĉ2 > csep ≥ cearly ≥ ĉ
If the fiscal authority sets the upper bound as c¯ = ĉ, it is always binding for
the bank since both ĉ2 and csep are weakly higher than ĉ. Therefore, the bank’s
optimal contract is ĉ and the economy is constrained efficient.
Case 3: Aearly < A ≤ Await
For s ∈ [0, s0), the constrained efficient allocation is (c∗, B∗) = (c˜, B˜). For
s ∈ [0, s¯), the equilibrium allocation is (c∗2, B∗2) = (c˜2, B∗sep(c˜2)). Pick, s4 =
min{s0, s¯}. For s ∈ [0, s4), it can be shown in similar manner as in Case 1 that
(c˜2, B
∗
sep(c˜2))  (c˜, B˜). If the fiscal authority sets the upper bound as c¯ = c˜, the
upper bound is binding. However, it might be true that csep ≤ c˜. The bank could
potentially choose csep in response to the upper bound set by the fiscal author-
ity. Since ĉ2 > csep, by the strict concavity of Ŵpri, Ŵpri(csep, B∗good(csep)) is strictly
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increasing in s. Also, choosing the upper bound set by the fiscal authority gives
W˜pri(c˜, B
∗
sep(c˜)), which is strictly decreasing in s. Therefore, there exists s5 > 0
such that
W˜pri(c˜, B
∗
sep(c˜)) > Ŵpri(csep, B
∗
good(csep))
for s ∈ [0, s5). Pick s¯ = min{s4, s5}. For s ∈ [0, s¯), the bank’s optimal contract is
c˜. The economy is constrained efficient.
A.17 Proof of Lemma 14
(c˜, B˜) solves the following first-order conditions:
(1− s)
{
p2
[
Ac˜−γ − A(2(1− τ)y − c˜+ B˜)−γ]
+ 2p(1− p)[Ac˜−γ −R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − c˜)−γ]}
+s
{[
p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2][c˜−γ − (2(1− τ)y − c˜+ B˜)−γ]} = 0
(A.19)
(1− s)
{
p2
[
A(2(1− τ)y − c˜+ B˜)−γ − 2D(2τy − B˜)−γ]}
+s
{[
p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2](2(1− τ)y − c˜+ B˜)−γ
− 2D(2τy − B˜)−γ
}
= 0 (A.20)
Using (A.20) to solve for B˜:
B˜ = 2τ − K1
1 +K1
(2y − c˜) ≡ 2τ −K2(2y − c˜) (A.21)
where
K1 =
[ [
(1− s)p2 + s]2D
(1− s)p2A+ s[p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2]
]1/γ
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Plugging (A.21) into (A.19):
[
(1− s)[p2A+ 2p(1− p)A] + s[p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2]]c˜−γ
=(1− s)2p(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − c˜)−γ
+
[
(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]((1−K2)(2y − c˜))−γ
(A.22)
Taking the derivative of (A.22) with respect to s:
− γ[(1− s)[p2A+ 2p(1− p)A] + s[p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2]]c˜−γ−1 dc˜
ds
+
[
p(1− p)(1− A) + (1− p)2]c˜−γ
=γ(1− s)2p(1− p)R1−γ(2(y − τ)− c˜)−γ−1 dc˜
ds
− 2p(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − c˜)−γ
+ γ
[
(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]
× (1−K2)−γ(2y − c˜)−γ−1 dc˜
ds
+ γ
[
(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]
× (1−K2)−γ−1(2y − c˜)−γ dK2
ds
+
[
p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2]((1−K2)(2y − c˜))−γ
sign
{
dc˜
ds
}
= sign
{[
p(1− p)(1− A) + (1− p)2]c˜−γ
+ 2p(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − c˜)−γ
− [p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2]((1−K2)(2y − c˜))−γ
− γ[(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]
× (1−K2)−γ−1(2y − c˜)−γ dK2
ds
}
(A.23)
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Find the derivative of c˜ with respect to τ :
− γ[(1− s)[p2A+ 2p(1− p)A] + s[p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2]]c˜−γ−1 dc˜
dτ
= γ(1− s)2p(1− p)R1−γ(2(y − τ)− c˜)−γ−1
(
2 +
dc˜
dτ
)
+ γ
[
(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]
× (1−K2)−γ(2y − c˜))−γ−1 dc˜
dτ
sign
{
dc˜
dτ
}
= sign
{
− 2γ(1− s)2p(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − c˜)−γ−1
}
< 0
dc˜
dτ
∈ (−1, 0)
Taking the derivative of the RHS of (A.23) with respect to τ :
dRHS
dτ
= −γ[p(1− p)(1− A) + (1− p)2]c˜−γ−1 dc˜
dτ
+ 2γp(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − c˜)−γ−1
(
dc˜
dτ
+ 2
)
− γ[p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2](1−K2)−γ(2y − c˜)−γ−1 dc˜
dτ
− γ2[(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]
× (1−K2)−γ−1(2y − c˜)−γ−1dK2
ds
dc˜
dτ
> γp(1− p)(A− 1)c˜−γ−1 dc˜
dτ
+ 4γp(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − c˜)−γ−1
+ 2γp(1− p)R1−γ(2(1− τ)y − c˜)−γ−1 dc˜
dτ
− γp(1− p)(A+ 1)(1−K2)−γ(2y − c˜)−γ−1 dc˜
dτ
> 0
There exists τ¯ such that τ ≤ τ¯ implies dc˜
ds
≤ 0 and τ > τ¯ implies dc˜
ds
> 0.
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Taking the derivative of W˜ (c˜, B˜) with respect to s:
dW˜ (c˜, B˜)
ds
=
[
(1− s)p2A+ s(p2A+ p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2)]
× (2(1− τ)y − c˜+ B˜)−γ dB˜
ds
+
1
γ − 1
{[
p(1− p)(A− 1)− (1− p)2]c˜1−γ
− 2p(1− p)((2(1− τ)y − c˜)R)1−γ
+
[
p(1− p)(A+ 1) + (1− p)2](2(1− τ)y − c˜+ B˜)1−γ}
If dc˜
ds
< 0 then dB˜
ds
< 0 and dW˜
ds
< 0. Therefore, τ ≤ τ¯ is sufficient.
A.18 Proof of Proposition 15
Define ĉ2 as the optimal contract of the bank assuming that there is always the
“good” pooling equilibrium in the post-deposit game, which is given by
ĉ ≡ arg max
c∈R+
Ŵpri(c, B
∗
good(c)) (A.24)
The first-order condition of (A.24) is
[
p2A+2p(1−p)A]ĉ−γ = p2A(1−Kgood)1−γ(2y−ĉ)−γ+2p(1−p)R1−γ(2(1−τ)y−ĉ)−γ
Taking the implicit derivative of the first-order condition with respect toA gives
− γ[p2A+ 2p(1− p)A]ĉ−γ−1 dĉ
dA
+
[
p2 + 2p(1− p)]ĉ−γ
=2p(1− p)R1−γγ(2(1− τ)y − ĉ)−γ−1 dĉ
dA
+ p2(1−Kgood)−γ
[
A(γ − 1)∂Kgood
∂A
+ p2(1−Kgood)
]
(2y − ĉ)−γ
+ p2A(1−Kgood)1−γγ(2y − ĉ)−γ−1 dĉ
dA
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sign
{
dĉ
dA
}
=sign
{[
p2 + 2p(1− p)]ĉ−γ
− p2(1−Kgood)−γ
[
A(γ − 1)∂Kgood
∂A
+ p2(1−Kgood)
]
(2y − ĉ)−γ
}
A sufficient condition for dĉ
dA
> 0 is
A(γ − 1)∂Kgood
∂A
+ p2(1−Kgood) ≤ 0
which is equivalent to
p ≤
√
γ − 1
γ
Kgood
Therefore, there exists a threshold A¯sep such that ĉ2 ≤ c for A ≤ A¯sep. Given that
the value function maxc∈R+ W˜pri(c, B∗sep(c)) is strictly decreasing in s, it is always
true that
max
c∈R+
Ŵ (c, B∗good(c)) ≥ max
c∈R+
W˜ (c, B∗sep(c))
The optimal contract is c∗2 = ĉ2 when A ≤ A¯sep. When A > A¯sep, the proof is
similar to Proposition 5.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Case 2: ε ≤ 1− pic1 and σ¯ ≤ 1− pic1
To analyze this case fully, a few Lemmas have to be developed.
Lemma 16. 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[
(1−pi
R
+pi)c1− (1− σ¯)
] ≥ 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
pic1 and 1− 2c1+σ¯σ¯
[
c1− (1−
σ¯)R
] ≥ 1− pic1 2c1+σ¯σ¯ if and only if
σ¯ ≤ 1− 1− pi
R
c1 (B.1)
Lemma 16 says that if (B.1) is satisfied, when bank B goes bankrupt, bank A
never goes banrkupt as long as the amount of withdrawal it receives from bank
B is sufficient for payments to all its impatient depositors. Notice that (B.1) is
always satisfied in Case 2 if and only if pi ≥ 1
1+R
.
Lemma 17. (1− pic1) 2pic1R(1−pic1)(1−pi)+pic1 ≥ 1− pic1 if and only if
c1 ≥ 1− pi
pi(2R− pi) (B.2)
Lemma 17 says that (2.9) is always satisfied in Case 2 if and only if (B.2) is
true. Lemma 12 to 17 will be used to summarize the outcome in Case 2.
Case 2.2: 1− 1−pi
R
c1 < σ¯ ≤ (1− pic1) 2pic1R(1−pic1)(1−pi)+pic1
Notice that this case exists only if pi < 1
1+R
. In this case, if bankB goes bankrupt,
it has to be the case that bank A also goes bankrupt. This is because
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R
]
≥ 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
pic1
> max
{
1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
, 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[
c1 − (1− σ¯)R
]}
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The outcome can be summarized as follow:
cA1 =

c1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
cA2 =

c2 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
cB1 =

c1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
cB2 =

1
1−pi
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)(1−ε−pic1)R
1−pic1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
Case 2.3: (1− pic1) 2pic1R(1−pic1)(1−pi)+pic1 < σ¯ ≤ 1− 1−piR c1
Notice from Lemma 17 that this case exists only if c1 < 1−pipi(2R−pi) . In this case, if
bank A goes bankrupt, it has to be that bank B also goes bankrupt, but not the
another way round. This is because
min
{
1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
, 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[
c1 − (1− σ¯)R
]}
≥ 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
pic1 > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R
]
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The outcome can be summarized as follow:
cA1 =

c1 if ε ≤ 1− 2c1+σ¯σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
if ε > 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
cA2 =

c2 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
1
1−pi
(
1− σ¯ − pic1 + (1−ε)σ¯2c1+σ¯
)
R if
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
< ε < 1− pic1 2c1+σ¯σ¯
1
1−pi
[
(1− σ¯)R + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
− pic1
]
if
1− pic1 2c1+σ¯σ¯
≤ ε ≤ 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
if ε > 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[(
1−pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
cB1 =

c1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
cB2 =

c2 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
Case 2.4: σ¯ > max{(1− pic1) 2pic1R(1−pic1)(1−pi)+pic1 , 1− 1−piR c1}
Notice that this case exists only if c1 < 1−pipi(2R−pi) and pi <
1
1+R
. In this case, when
bank B goes bankrupt, it is not necessary the case that bank A always depletes
the withdrawal from bankB from paying its impatient depositors. The outcome
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can be summarized as follow:
cA1 =

c1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
c1 if
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
< ε ≤ 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[
c1 − (1− σ¯)R
]
1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
if ε > 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[
c1 − (1− σ¯)R
]
cA2 =

c2 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
1
1−pi
[
(1− σ¯)R− pic1 + (1−ε)σ¯2c1+σ¯
]
if
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
< ε ≤ 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[
c1 − (1− σ¯)R
]
1− σ¯ + (1−ε)σ¯
2c1+σ¯
if ε > 1− 2c1+σ¯
σ¯
[
c1 − (1− σ¯)R
]
cB1 =

c1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
cB2 =

1
1−pi
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)(1−ε−pic1)R
1−pic1 if ε ≤ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
2(1−ε)c1
2c1+σ¯
if ε > (1− pic1)
[
1− (1−pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
−pic1)R
]
Notice that it is not necessary the case that
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R
]
< 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[
c1 − (1− σ¯)R
]
(B.3)
If (B.3) is not satisfied, there does not exist a measure of ε such that bank B goes
bankrupt but bank A does not. Either both banks go bankrupt or both do not.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 12
(1− pic1)
[
2
σ¯
(
1−
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1
)
− 1
]
≥ (1− pic1)
[
1− (1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R
]
2
σ¯
(
1−
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1
)
− 1 ≥ 1− (1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R
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[
2− 2(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − σ¯
](
1− σ¯
2
− pic1
)
R
≥ (1− σ¯
2
− pic1
)
Rσ¯ − (1− pi)c1σ¯
2(1− pic1)R− 2
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
(1− pic1)c1R +
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
Rc1σ¯ −Rσ¯
≥ 2(1− pic1)Rσ¯ −Rσ¯2 − (1− pi)c1σ¯
σ¯2 +
[(
2
(1− pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 1− 2(1− pic1)
]
σ¯
+
[
2− 2
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1
]
(1− pic1) ≥ 0
Notice that (
2
(1− pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 1− 2(1− pic1)
can be rewritten as
2
((1− pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 2− (1− pic1) < 0
which we know is always negative. Using the quadratic formula
B2 − 4AC =
[(
2
(1− pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 3
]2
− 4
[
2− 2
(
1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1
]
(1− pic1)
=
[(
2
(1− pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 1
]2
(B.4)
the inequality is simplified to
σ¯ ≤
3−
(
2
(
1−pi
R
)
+ 3pi
)
c1 −
∣∣(2(1−pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 1
∣∣
2
or
σ¯ ≥
3−
(
2
(
1−pi
R
)
+ 3pi
)
c1 +
∣∣(2(1−pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 1
∣∣
2
If
(
2
(
1−pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 1 ≥ 0, the condition simplifies to
σ¯ ≤ 1− pic1 or σ¯ ≥ 2− 2
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 (B.5)
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If
(
2
(
1−pi
R
)
+ pi
)
c1 − 1 < 0, the condition simplifies to
σ¯ ≤ 2− 2
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 or σ¯ ≥ 1− pic1 (B.6)
In both cases the condition is always satisfied as long as σ¯ ≥ 1− pic1
B.3 Proof of Lemma 13
(1− pic1)
[
1− (1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R
]
≥ 1− pic1 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
1− pic− 1− (1− pic1)(1− pi)c1
(1− σ¯
2
− pic1)R ≥ 1− pic1
2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
(1− pic1)(1− pi)c1σ¯ ≤ 2pic21
(
1− σ¯
2
− pic1
)
R[
(1− pic1)(1− pi)c1 + pic21
]
σ¯ ≤ 2pic21(1− pic1)R
σ¯ ≤ (1− pic1) 2pic1R
(1− pic1)(1− pi) + pic1 (B.7)
B.4 Proof of Lemma 16
First part:
1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
]
≥ 1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
pic1
pic1 ≥
(1− pi
R
+ pi
)
c1 − (1− σ¯)
σ¯ ≤ 1− 1− pi
R
c1 (B.8)
Second part:
1− 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
[
c1 − (1− σ¯)R
] ≥ 1− pic1 2c1 + σ¯
σ¯
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pic1 ≥ c1 − (1− σ¯)R
R− (1− pi)c1 ≥ Rσ¯
σ¯ ≤ 1− 1− pi
R
c1 (B.9)
B.5 Proof of Lemma 17
(1− pic1) 2pic1R
(1− pic1)(1− pi) + pic1 > 1− pic1
2pic1R > (1− pic1)(1− pi) + pic1[
2piR− pi + pi(1− pi)]c1 > 1− pi
c1 >
1− pi
pi(2R− pi) (B.10)
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